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FINANCIAL REPRESSION IN CHINA:
SHORT-TERM GROWTH BUT LONGTERM CRISIS?
GUANGDONG XU & MICHAEL FAURE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between financial development and economic
growth has been of high interest for economists over the past three
decades. It has attracted numerous empirical studies that use countrylevel, industry-level, and firm-level data to explore the issue. It appears
that the evidence as a whole tends to favor the argument that finance
matters for or even causes economic growth.1 In two survey papers,
Levine concludes that the evidence “suggests a positive, first-order
relationship between financial development and economic growth,”2 and
“taken as a whole, the bulk of existing research suggests that countries
with better functioning banks and markets grow faster.”3 In a recent
survey paper that uses meta-analysis methods, Valickova, Havranek, and
Horvath also report that “the literature as a whole documents a moderate,
but statistically significant, positive link between financial development

* The authors would like to thank the financial support from the Program for Young
Innovative Research Teams of the CUPL (project number 16CXTD 09). We are grateful to Marina
Jodogne (Maastricht) for excellent editorial assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. However, the more recent studies challenge the conventional wisdom that finance
unconditionally, linearly, and monotonically contributes to or even causes economic growth. By
contrast, the finance-growth nexus is now shown to be non-linear, non-monotonic, but rather
context-dependent. See, e.g., Jean L. Arcand, Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance?,
20 J. ECON. GROWTH 105, 107 (2015).
2. See generally Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and
Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997).
3. Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, in 1A HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH 865, 868 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005).

1

XU & FAURE (FINAL_FOR_JCI) (DO NOT DELETE)

2

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

10/28/2019 2:07 PM

[Vol. 42:1

and economic growth.”4 A report issued by the World Bank therefore
concludes that “finance is central to development.”5
However, there are certain apparent anomalies to the “finance
matters” hypothesis—the most notable of those anomalies is China,
which has experienced remarkable economic growth over the past four
decades and has surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy.6
However, China’s financial system can hardly be considered a supporting
force during this process. According to Allen, Qian, and Qian, “China is
an important counterexample to the findings in the law, institutions,
finance, and growth literature: neither its legal nor financial system is
well developed, yet it has one of the fastest growing economies.”7
Similarly, Naughton argues that “the financial system is lagging behind
other aspects of China’s economic development and may become a
source of economic vulnerability.”8
More accurately, China’s financial system is not only weak and
underdeveloped, but also repressed. This is evident in how China’s
financial system conforms to the stereotype described by the financial
repression theory.9 The banking sector, which accounts for approximately
90% of China’s financial assets, is still dominated by state ownership; in
addition, interest rates are still controlled by the government, and credit
allocation is heavily influenced by political factors rather than by
commercial motives. All these features will, as suggested by the financial
repression theory,10 contribute to financial resources misallocation, social
welfare loss, and growth slowdown or economic recession.
How has China been able to achieve such remarkable success in
economic development, despite a repressed financial system, which is
suggested to be harmful for economic growth? In earlier literature, the
4. Petra Valickova, Tomas Havranek & Roman Horvath, Financial Development and
Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis, 29 J. ECON. SURV. 506, 522 (2015).
5. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: RETHINKING THE
ROLE OF THE STATE IN FINANCE 17 (2012), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
11848.
6. David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html.
7. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China,
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 57 (2005).
8. BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 449 (2007).
9. Guangdong Xu, Financial Repression, Economic Distortion, and China’s Growth
Miracle, in ECONOMICS & REGULATIONS IN CHINA 11 (Michael Faure & Guangdong Xu eds.,
2013). For a description of the concept of financial repression see, e.g., Hiro Ito, Financial
Repression, in 1 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 430 (Kenneth Reinert
& Ramkishen Rajan eds., 2008).
10. The features of financial repression as summarized in the financial repression theory will
be presented in the next section. See infra Part II.
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financial repression in China has been presented as a double-edged
sword: on the one hand, it has helped China accomplish extraordinary
economic growth in the short run by subsidizing investment and
production; on the other hand, it endangers China’s long-term economic
health by damaging its economic efficiency, slowing job creation, and
distorting the country’s economic structure.11 It is, therefore, unsurprising
to witness the co-existence of a repressed financial system and a fastgrowing economy in China, at least in the short run.
In this article, we will explain how the Chinese government uses
financial regulation as a tool of China’s financial repression. We will
analyze the financial repression system as it is characterized by a variety
of different regulations. Particular attention will be given to new
developments in China’s financial regulation since 2008. At that time, the
Chinese government adopted an impressive stimulus program as a
response to the global financial crisis. We will also identify particular
institutional variables, such as the governance strategies of the party state,
the political struggles among factions, and the influence of interest
groups, which each have an important impact on the development of
financial regulation in China. Using political economy theory, we will
show how these political underpinnings explain the repressed financial
system in China.
That will finally lead us to conclude that these political-institutional
variables also are the cause of the difficulties in reforming the financial
sector in China. Within the current party state in China, we argue that
reform towards a more market-based direction is virtually impossible. A
true market-based financial system is only possible if it is accompanied
with political reforms that handcuff the grabbing hand of the party state.
We develop this argument as follows: Section II starts by offering a
comprehensive overview of the economic theory of financial repression.
Next, Section III describes the development of financial repression in
China, showing how in various sectors, more particularly banking and
financial markets, regulation aims toward financial repression, and
describes the features of the repressed financial system. Section IV pays
detailed attention to the new development of financial regulation in China
since 2008 when a fiscal stimulus package was adopted. Economic

11. For earlier studies, see Xu, supra note 9; Guangdong Xu & Binwei Gui, The Connection
Between Financial Repression and Economic Growth: The Case of China, 12 J. COMP. ASIAN DEV.
385 (2013) [hereinafter Xu & Gui, The Case of China]; Guangdong Xu & Binwei Gui, Does
Financial Repression Retard China’s Economic Growth? An Empirical Examination, in THE ROLE
OF LAW & REGULATION IN SUSTAINING FINANCIAL MARKETS 73 (Niels Philipsen & Guangdong
Xu eds., 2014) [hereinafter Xu & Gui, An Empirical Examination].
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consequences of the financial repression will be discussed in Section V.
Having analyzed the economic consequences of the financial repression,
Section VI turns to an analysis based on political economy. It explores
the institutional-political factors that may contribute to the distortion of
the financial system in China, such as the legitimacy-seeking efforts of
the party state, the necessity to subsidize state-owned enterprises
(“SOEs”), and the attempt to co-opt private enterprises. Section VII
concludes.
II. FINANCIAL REPRESSION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Financial repression, according to Ito, refers to “the notion that a set
of government regulations, laws, and other non-market restrictions
prevent the financial intermediaries of an economy from functioning at
their full capacity.”12 The policies that cause financial repression include
interest rate ceilings, liquidity ratio requirements, high bank reserve
requirements, capital controls, restrictions on market entry into the
financial sector, credit ceilings or restrictions on the direction of credit
allocation, and the government’s ownership or control of banks.13
Financial repression theory has its origins in the works of McKinnon
and Shaw.14 McKinnon and Shaw argue that many countries, including
developed ones but especially developing ones,15 have historically
restricted competition in the financial sector with government
interventions and regulations. According to their argument, a repressed
financial sector discourages both saving and investment because the rates
of return are lower than what could be obtained in a competitive market.
In such a system, financial intermediates do not function at their full
capacity and fail to channel savings into investment efficiently, thereby
impeding the development of the overall economic system. According to
Shaw, financial repression reduces “the real rate of growth and the real
size of the financial system relative to non-financial magnitudes. In all

12. Ito, supra note 9, at 1.
13. Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government Debt, 30
ECON. POL’Y 291, 296 (2015).
14. See RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 69
(1973); EDWARD S. SHAW, FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 80 (1973).
15. Reinhart & Sbrancia, supra note 13, at 298, report that, for advanced economies, real
interest rates were negative in about half of the years during the 1945-1980 period. As a result of
this repression policy, the average annual interest expense savings for their twelve-country sample
ranged from 1% to 5% of GDP. The massive stocks of debt that accumulated during World War II
were therefore reduced or liquidated: the average annual liquidation effect (debt reduction during
years of negative interest rates) ranged from 0.3% to 4% of GDP for their full sample.
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cases, this strategy has stopped or gravely slowed the development
process.”16
The most important regulatory tool to reach financial repression is
interest rate ceilings, (A); another tool is restrictions on entry into the
financial sector, more particularly on banking, (B). One of the
conclusions outlined below, urges developing countries to move toward
financial liberalization in order to stimulate economic growth, (C). The
effects of such liberalization are, however, not always clear. Empirical
evidence indicates that financial liberalization only works if it is
accompanied with an effective regulation of financial markets, (D).
A. Interest Rate Ceilings
Interest rate ceilings are one of the most commonly used strategies
of financial repression. When an interest rate ceiling is set at a level that
is below the market-clearing equilibrium rate, the demand for loanable
funds will greatly exceed the available supply. This excess demand calls
for the rationing of the limited supply and that in turn leads to inefficient
economic outcomes:
Rationing is expensive to administer. It is vulnerable to corruption and
conspiracy in dividing between borrowers and officers of the
intermediary monopoly rent that arise from the difference between
low, regulated loan rate and the market-clearing rate. Borrowers who
simply do not repay loans and keep their place in the ration queue by
extending maturities can frustrate it. The rationing process
discriminates poorly among investment opportunities . . . and the
social cost of this misallocation is suggested by the high incremental
ratios of investment to output that lagging economies report.17

Interest rate ceilings also distort the economy in other ways. 18 “First,
low interest rates produce a bias in favor of current consumption and
against future consumption.19 Therefore, these rates may reduce savings
below the socially optimal level. Second, potential lenders may engage
in relatively low-yielding direct investments instead of lending by way of
depositing money in a bank. Third, bank borrowers who are able to obtain
all their desired funds at low loan rates will choose relatively capitalintensive projects. Fourth, the pool of potential borrowers includes

16. SHAW, supra note 14, at 3-4.
17. Id. at 86.
18. Maxwell J. Fry, In Favour of Financial Liberalisation, 107 ECON. J. 754, 755 (1997).
19. The reason is clear: if interest rates are low, consumers will have no incentive to save for
future consumption but will rather have the tendency to consume now, given the low gains of
saving.
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entrepreneurs with low-yielding projects, who would not want to borrow
at the higher market-clearing interest rate.”
The influence of interest rate distortion has been tested by numerous
empirical studies, many of which have identified a negative association
between interest rate repression and certain fundamental macroeconomic
variables, such as savings rates, investment, and economic growth.20 For
example, Fry tests the validity of the McKinnon-Shaw model for seven
less-developed countries in Asia and concludes that the real rate of
interest exerts a positive influence on the ratio of domestic savings to
GNP: a 10% increase in the real rate of interest would raise the ratio of
savings to GNP by approximately 1.4-2.1%.21 Fry reports that financial
distortions, as measured by the real interest rate squared and the black
market exchange rate premium, reduce investment ratios (and export
growth), 22 which in turn reduce output growth rates.23 Roubini and Salai-Martin show the harmful effects of financial repression on economic
growth:24 countries with real interest rates of less than -5% in the 1970s
experienced growth rates that averaged 1.4 percentage points less than
growth rates in countries with positive real interest rates. 25
20. For more general surveys on the role of financial repression (as opposed to financial
liberalization) in economic development, see Paul Auerbach & Jalal Uddin Siddiki, Financial
Liberalisation and Economic Development: An Assessment, 18 J. ECON. SURV. 231, 247 (2004);
Konstantinos Loizos, The Financial Repression-Liberalization Debate: Taking Stock, Looking for
Synthesis, 32 J. ECON. SURV. 440, 445 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12195.
21. Maxwell J. Fry, Money and Capital or Financial Deepening in Economic Development,
10 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 464, 469-70, 474 (1978). See also, Maxwell J. Fry, Saving,
Investment, Growth and the Cost of Financial Repression, 8 WORLD DEV. 317, 317 (1980); Prem
S. Laumas, Monetization, Financial Liberalization, and Economic Development, 38 ECON. DEV.
& CULTURAL CHANGE 377, 385-86 (1990); Ashfaque H. Khan & Lubna Hasan, Financial
Liberalization, Savings and Economic Development in Pakistan, 46 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 581, 582 (1998). But see KANHAYA L. GUPTA, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984); Alberto Giovannini, Saving and the Real Interest Rate in LDCs,
18 J. DEV. ECON. 197, 198 (1985); Oriana Bandiera, Gerard Caprio, Patrick Honohan & Fabio
Schiantarelli, Does Financial Reform Raise or Reduce Saving?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 239, 239
(2000). After systematically reviewing the related literature, Loizos, supra note 20, at 446,
concludes that “the relationship between real interest rates and saving is more complicated than the
McKinnon–Shaw model implies.”
22. Fry, supra note 18, at 765-67.
23. But see Joshua Green & Delano Villanueva, Private Investment in Developing Countries:
An Empirical Analysis, 38 IMF STAFF PAPERS 33, 53 (1991) (revealing a negative and significant
effect of real interest rates on investment); Mauro Costantini, Panicos O. Demetriades, Gregory A.
James & Kevin C. Lee, Financial Restraints and Private Investment: Evidence From a
Nonstationary Panel, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 248, 257 (2012) (showing that interest rate liberalization
has a negative effect on investment).
24. Nouriel Roubini & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Financial Repression and Economic Growth, 39
J. DEV. ECON. 5, 28 (1992).
25. Jose De Gregorio & Pablo E. Guidotti, Financial Development and Economic Growth, 23
WORLD DEV. 433, 437 (1995) (claiming that the relationship between real interest rates and
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B. Entry Restrictions and State Ownership
Other repression policies are also considered harmful to financial
development.26 For example, entry restrictions, despite some possible
justifications for their adoption—such as promoting bank stability and
protecting the economy from the negative effects of bank failure—may
be implemented by regulators in response to the demands of incumbent
bankers, who are eager to protect their rents from the competition of new
entrants. The adverse effects of regulatory restrictions on competition in
banking have been confirmed by empirical evidence from around the
world.27 After reviewing literature on the impact of bank competition,
Berger, Demirgue-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich concluded that “[m]ore
regulatory restrictions on bank competition are associated with bad
outcomes—such as less favorable prices for customers, less access to
credit, and reduced stability of the financial system.”28 Similarly, state
ownership in the banking sector is shown to have a detrimental
relationship with financial development and economic growth.29 Greater
state ownership of banks tends to be associated with higher interest rate
spreads, less private credit, less stock exchange activity, less non-bank
credit, a higher probability of financial crisis, lower productivity, and
slower GDP growth.30
economic growth may resemble an inverted “U” rather than a monotonically increasing or
decreasing curve); Fry, supra note 18, at 764, (showing that growth is maximized when the real
interest rate lies within the range of -5 to 15%).
26. Huang Yiping, Gou Qin & Wang Xun, Financial Liberalization and then Middle-Income
Trap: What Can China Learn From the Cross-Country Experience?, 31 CHINA ECON. REV. 426,
429, 431 (2014). The authors construct an indicator of financial repression, which captures
repressive financial policies in seven dimensions: (1) credit controls and reserve requirements, (2)
interest rate controls, (3) entry barriers to the bank industry, (4) state ownership of banks, (5)
policies on securities markets, (6) banking regulations, and (7) restrictions on the capital account.
They then report that the connection between their financial repression indicator and economic
growth in a cross-country sample of 80 economies is non-linear: the growth effect of financial
repression is insignificant among low-income economies, significantly negative among middleincome economies and significantly positive among high-income economies.
27. JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO & ROSS LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION:
TILL ANGELS GOVERN 50 (2006).
28. Allen N. Berger, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Ross Levine & Joseph G. Haubrich, Bank
Concentration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING
433, 445 (2004).
29. WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR GROWTH: POLICY CHOICES IN A VOLATILE WORLD (2001).
30. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government
Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 265 (2002) (reporting that “higher government ownership of
banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per
capita income and productivity.”); William L. Megginson, The Economics of Bank Privatization,
29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1931, 1931 (2005) (concluding in a survey paper that “the empirical evidence
clearly shows that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state
domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest
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C. Financial Liberalization
As previously mentioned, McKinnon and Shaw argued that
government regulation aimed at suppressing the financial sector
discourages both savings and investments and, therefore, stunts economic
growth. The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis has been challenged by a range
of critics.31 However, its main policy recommendation, financial
liberalization,32 has gained momentum among policy makers in
developing countries. As a result, the last forty years have witnessed a
gradual removal of financial restraints worldwide. As reported by Abiad

state banking sector.”). Privatization is therefore associated with significant performance
improvement in divested banks, although the extent of improvement varies by region and the stage
of national development. But see Alejandro Micco, Ugo Panizza & Monica Yañez, Bank Ownership
and Performance: Does Politics Matter?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 219, 220 (2007) (Reporting that
the negative impact of state-owned banks is not universal but dependent on a country’s initial
conditions); Tobias Körner & Isabel Schnabel, Public Ownership of Banks and Economic Growth:
The Impact of Country Heterogeneity, 19 ECON. TRANSITION 1, 5 (2010) (Reporting that the
negative impact of state-owned banks is not universal but dependent on a country’s degree of
financial development and quality of political institutions).
31. See, e.g., Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Financial
Restraint: Towards a New Paradigm, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 10, 21, 50 (Masahiko Aoki, HyungKi Kim & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara eds., 1997) (Arguing in a study of the financial policies in
East Asian economies, that a modest financial repression, or “financial restraint” in their terms, is
beneficial to economic growth because under financial restraint, the government can create rent
opportunities in the private sector through a set of financial policies. These rents may induce private
sector agents to increase the supply of goods and services that might be under-provided in a purely
competitive market, such as the monitoring of investments and the provision of deposit collection.)
See also Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral
Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 147, 148 (2000) (suggesting that financial liberalization, particularly competition in financial
markets, may increase the moral hazard problem of banks by eroding their profits, which in turn
undermines their franchise values (the capitalized value of expected future profits) and induce
banks to gamble on riskier projects); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic
Growth, and Instability, 28 WORLD DEV. 1075, 1076 (2000) (further contending that “it has
become increasingly clear that there is not only no case for capital market liberalization, but that
there is a fairly compelling case against full liberalization.”) (italics in original).
32. John Williamson & Molly Mahar, A Survey of Financial Liberalization, 211 ESSAYS
INT’L FIN. 1, 2 (1998). The authors characterize financial liberalization as “the process of giving
the market the authority to determine who gets and grants credit and at what price,” and full
liberalization involves “the government’s also allowing entry into the financial-services industry to
any company that can satisfy objectively specified criteria based on prudential considerations
(concerning capital, skills, and reputation), giving banks the autonomy to run their own affairs,
withdrawal from the ownership of financial institutions, and abandoning control over international
capital movements.” This characterization suggests six dimensions of financial liberalization: the
elimination of credit controls; the deregulation of interest rates; free entry into the banking sector
or, more generally, the financial-services industry; bank autonomy; private ownership of banks;
and the liberalization of international capital flows.
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and Mody,33 and Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel,34 despite stops, gaps,
and reversals, financial liberalization advanced across much of the world
during the period from 1973 to 2005. Countries in all income groups have
liberalized, although higher-income economies have largely remained
more liberalized than lower-income economies. However, financial
liberalization has proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
financial liberalization can benefit an economy by generating more
competition in the financial sector forcing financial institutions to
improve their operational efficiency. Additionally, financial
liberalization increases the availability of funds, which in turn lowers the
cost of capital, stimulates investment, and promotes economic growth.
The positive effects of financial liberalization have been confirmed by
certain empirical studies. For example, Henry reports that in the late
1980s and early 1990s, when a number of developing countries
liberalized their stock markets, thereby opening them to foreign investors,
the cost of capital (dividend yields) decreased by an average of 2.4
percentage points, the growth rate of investment increased by 1.1
percentage points, and the growth rate of output per worker increased by
2.3 percentage points.35
33. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?, 95
AM. ECON. REV. 66, 66 (2005).
34. Abdul Abiad, Enrica Detragiache & Thierry Tressel, A New Database of Financial
Reforms, 57 IMF STAFF PAPERS, 281, 288, 291, 293 (2010). The authors further show that most
financial reforms concentrated in the first half of the 1990s, and after peaking in 1995, the
liberalization process began to slow down. In addition, financial systems were on average most
liberalized in the areas of interest rate controls, bank entry, and financial account restrictions, but
bank supervision and regulation lagged behind.
35. See Peter B. Henry, Capital-Account Liberalization, the Cost of Capital, and Economic
Growth, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 91, 94 (2003). See also Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey &
Christian Lundblad, Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 13 (2005)
(reporting that equity market liberalization, on average, led to a 1% increase in annual real
economic growth); Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann & Lorenza Martinez, Liberalization,
Growth, Financial Crises: Lessons from Mexico and the Developing World, 34 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 12 (2003) (finding that following financial (stock market)
liberalization, growth in GDP per capita increases by 2.4 percentage points a year in their 35
countries sample).
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of capital account liberalization (which is used
by most studies as the proxy for financial liberalization) on economic growth is generally more
mixed: whereas most of the studies that perform cross-sectional regressions fail to find a significant
effect, literature that focuses on the aftermath of a discrete policy change in a given country finds
that capital account liberalization generates economically large and statistically significant effects,
not only on economic growth but also on the cost of capital and investment. Peter B. Henry, Capital
Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and Speculation, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 887, 900,
915 (2007).
A recent study that conducts a meta-analysis (based on 441 t-statistics reported in 60 empirical
studies) shows that on average, there is a positive effect of financial liberalization on growth;
however, the significance of this effect is weak. Silke Bumann, Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink,

XU & FAURE (FINAL_FOR_JCI) (DO NOT DELETE)

10

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

10/28/2019 2:07 PM

[Vol. 42:1

On the other hand, financial liberalization is blamed for
destabilizing an economy by bringing about a greater incidence of crisis.
For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart report that in eighteen of the
twenty-six banking crises that they studied, the financial sector had been
liberalized during the preceding five years. 36 A similar association
between financial liberalization and financial crisis is further confirmed
by Williamson and Mahar,37 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache,38 and
Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez,39 among others.40 Loayza and
Ranciere therefore suggest a “dual effect” of financial liberalization; in
other words, financial liberalization can generate both instability—in the
short run—and higher growth—in the long run.41
Several macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, such as low
GDP growth, high inflation, and poor bank management, can be

Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis, 33 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 255
(2013).
36. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking
and Balance-of-Payments Problems, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 473, 480 (1999).
37. Williamson & Mahar, supra note 32, at 53.
38. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Financial Liberalization and Financial
Fragility, 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 98/83, 1998), https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/wp9883.pdf; Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, The Determinants of Banking
Crises in Developing and Developed Countries, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 81 (1998) [hereinafter
Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, Financial Liberalization].
39. Tornell et al., supra note 35, at 1.
40. Recent studies find that the relationship between financial liberalization and financial
crisis is more complicated. See, Romain Ranciere, Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann,
Decomposing the Effects of Financial Liberalization: Crises vs. Growth, 30 J. BANKING & FIN.
3331, 3331 (2006) (reporting that financial liberalization has a positive effect on economic growth,
which outweighs the increased probability of financial crisis); Graciela Laura Kaminsky & Sergio
L. Schmukler, Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles,
12 REV. FIN. 253, 18 (2008) (finding that financial liberalization in emerging markets is related to
financial instability only in the short run); Apanard Angkinand, Wanvimol Sawangngoenyuang &
Clas Wihlborg, Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, 10 INT’L.
REV. FIN. 263, 263-292 (2010) (showing that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
financial liberalization and the likelihood of crisis). See also Christopher A. Hartwell, If You’re
Going Through Hell, Keep Going: Non-linear Effects of Financial Liberalization in Transition
Economies, 53 EMERGING MKT. FIN. & TRADE 250, 250-75 (2017) (reporting a non-linear
relationship between financial liberalization and banking crises).
Certain studies refute the connection between financial liberalization and crisis by showing
that the indicators of financial liberalization do not trigger banking crises, see Helmi Hamdi &
Nabila Boukef Jlassi, Financial Liberalization, Disaggregated Capital Flows and Banking Crisis:
Evidence from Developing Countries, 41 ECON MODELING 124, 124 (2014), or actually reduce the
likelihood of systemic crises, see Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad & Jakob De Haan, Financial Reform
and Banking Crises, 2 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2870, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1521414.
41. Norman Loayza & Romain Ranciere, Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and
Growth, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1, 23 (2006).
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identified as responsible for liberalization-led crisis.42 A key to
understanding the connection between financial liberalization and
financial crisis lies in the fact that by giving banks and other financial
intermediaries more freedom of action, financial liberalization increases
the opportunities to take on risk.43 Moreover, the skills of evaluating and
screening risky investment projects, monitoring borrowers, and
managing a loan portfolio are scarce resources in a newly liberalized
banking system. Such skills can only be acquired gradually through a
process of “learning by doing.” In addition, moral hazard problems
created by the limited liability of financial institutions, together with the
presence of implicit or explicit government guarantees to depositors,44
further increase bankers’ preference for risk to a level far greater than
what is socially desirable. Unless these perverse incentives are controlled,
increased risk taking due to moral hazard can become a powerful source
of financial fragility.
D. Effective Regulation of Financial Markets
A well-designed and effective system of prudential regulation and
supervision has been advocated as a possible solution to the problem of
excessive risk taking by banks in the process of financial liberalization.45
Prudential regulation and supervision can limit moral hazard by, for
example, mandating a minimum capital requirement, requiring
information disclosure, and limiting risk exposure to particular
geographical regions, counterparties, instruments and types of business.
Prudential regulation and supervision are therefore claimed to be a
prerequisite for successful financial liberalization.46 Williamson and
Mahar further construct an index of the level of prudential regulation and
supervision in thirty-four economies for the period of 1973 to 1995,
42. Gerard Caprio Jr. & Daniela Klingebiel, Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad
Banking?, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996 79
(Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1996). See also Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, supra note
38, at 19.
43. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3 (1999), for a report stating that with financial restrictions lifted, banks in
developing countries expanded their lending by 15% to 30% per year, which was more than double
the typical lending growth rate.
44. Charles W. Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, Deposit Insurance: Theories and Facts, 8
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 97-112 (2016). After systematically reviewing the literature, the authors
conclude that deposit insurance “increases bank risk rather than reducing it. Although insurance is
justified economically as a means of limiting liquidity risk, its adverse effect on banks’ fundamental
risk taking dominates the reduction in liquidity risk and results in greater overall banking
instability.”
45. See Fry, supra note 18, at 768.
46. See id. at 759.
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finding empirical support for the belief that good supervision is a crucial
element in avoiding the progression from liberalization to crisis. 47
Similarly, Noy reports that a combination of domestic financial
liberalization and lax supervision by the authorities yields a significant
increase in the likelihood of financial crisis;48 Angkinand,
Sawangngoenyuang, and Wihlborg find that the relationship between
financial liberalization and banking crises depends strongly on the
strength of capital regulation and supervision;49 and Amri and Kocher
find a significant and negative relationship between banking crisis
probability and the strength of financial sector supervision.50
However, it is a very difficult, if not impossible, task to create and
maintain an effective regulatory regime in developing countries. As
studies have shown, the effectiveness of financial regulation is to a large
extent subject to the underlying institutional environment. For example,
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine find that when national indicators
of economic freedom or property rights protection are controlled for, the
effects of bank regulation on the net interest margins and overhead costs
of banks become insignificant.51 Similarly, Chortareas, Girardone, and
Ventouri report that the beneficial effects of capital regulation and official
supervisory powers on bank efficiency are more pronounced in countries
with higher-quality institutions.52 In other words, bank regulations cannot
be viewed in isolation from the overall institutional framework. However,
in many developing countries, political and legal institutions designed to
check the abuse of power are weak, and the state is susceptible to capture
by powerful elites, thus easily becoming a grabbing hand rather than a
helping hand.53 We will examine these political determinants in Section
VI.

47. Williamson & Mahar, supra note 32, at 61-62.
48. See Ilan Noy, Financial Liberalization, Prudential Supervision, and the Onset of Banking
Crises, 5 EMERGING MKT. REV. 341, 344 (2004).
49. See Angkinand et al., supra note 40. More specifically, with very weak regulation and
supervision, the probability of banking crises increases with liberalization, but this relationship
reverses as regulation and supervision becomes stricter. Id. at 27.
50. See generally Puspa Delima Amri & Brett Matthew Kocher, The Political Economy of
Financial Sector Supervision and Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, 18 EUR. L.J. 24
(2011).
51. See Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Regulations, Market Structure,
Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1, 27
(2004).
52. Georgios E. Chortareas, Claudia Girardone & Alexia Ventouri, Bank Supervision,
Regulation, and Efficiency: Evidence from the European Union, 8 J. FIN. STABILITY 1, 32 (2012).
53. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND:
GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998).
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E. Summary
This overview of the literature concerning financial repression
shows a balanced picture: McKinnon and Shaw argue that financial
repression may slow down economic growth as it will discourage both
savings and investments. To an important extent, this hypothesis has been
confirmed in empirical studies that have tested the effects of financial
repression on economic growth. However, the literature equally indicates
that financial liberalization, the seemingly obvious policy
recommendation from the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, is not
unproblematic. Without adequate prudential regulation and supervision
of financial institutions, there is a serious risk that financial liberalization
could lead to financial instability and potentially to financial crises. The
literature therefore advocates that financial liberalization should,
especially in developing countries, be accompanied with an effective
regulation of financial markets.
Insight into the main findings of the theoretical and empirical
literature is of particular importance for the situation of China. The
traditional hypothesis that financial repression slows economic growth
raises the obvious question as to how, in China, financial repression
actually led to a stimulation of economic growth. Likewise, financial
liberalization is propagated as the remedy to be implemented by
developing countries to stimulate economic growth. Yet, China seems to
show the opposite having such effect. Before delving into the precise
relationship between financial repression and economic growth in China
in Section V, we first provide a more detailed account of the development
of financial repression in China through a variety of regulations (Sections
III and IV).
III. FINANCIAL REPRESSION IN CHINA
In order to understand the current system of financial repression in
China, we first sketch the historical development, (A), and then describe
the specific features of the repressed financial system, (B). Recent
developments, related to policy reaction to the financial crisis of 2008,
will be discussed in Section IV.
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A. The Historical Development54
The best way to sketch the historical development of the system of
financial repression in China is by examining the important role of the
country’s banking sector, (1), and financial markets, (2).
1. The Banking Sector
When economic reform began in the late 1970s, there was hardly a
real financial system in China. Prior to 1978, China’s financial sector
consisted of a single bank, the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”), which
was owned and controlled by the central government under the Ministry
of Finance (“MOF”). The PBOC served as both a central bank and as a
commercial bank, controlling approximately 93% of the total financial
assets of the country and handling almost all financial transactions.55
However, the PBOC could not have been considered an effective
intermediary between savers and investors. First, household savings, the
source of bank deposits in developing market economies, were
extraordinarily small. Meanwhile, investment was financed
predominantly from interest-free budgetary grants and, to a lesser degree,
from the retained profits of enterprises. The PBOC concentrated its
lending on providing a portion of the working capital needs of enterprises.
The situation has drastically changed since the beginning of the
economic reforms in the country. As a virtual mono-bank serving much
of the economy, the PBOC was gradually stripped of its corporate finance
functions and began operating as the country’s central bank.56 Four stateowned banks then emerged to function as financial intermediaries and to
provide commercial banking services. The first was the Agriculture Bank
of China (“ABC”), which was founded in February 1979 to serve all
banking business in rural areas. The second was the Bank of China
(“BOC”), which was previously subordinate to the PBOC and then
became independent and empowered to specialize in transactions related
54. See generally, Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, China’s Financial System: Past,
Present, and Future, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 506 (Loren Brandt &
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008), for a more complete history of the entire financial system;
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION (1998) (discussing China’s
financial reform before 1998); CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE
FRAGILE FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2012); JOSEPH P.H. FAN
& RANDALL MORCK, CAPITALIZING CHINA (2012) (discussing more recent financial system
development).
55. Allen et al., supra note 54, at 6.
56. In September 1983, the State Council designated the PBOC as the central bank and
decided to establish the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to assume the deposit taking and
lending functions of the PBOC. The central bank role played by the PBOC was ultimately
legitimized by the Central Bank Law, which was enacted in 1995.
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to foreign trade and investment. The third was the People’s Construction
Bank of China (“PCBC”), renamed the China Construction Bank, or
“CCB,” in 1996), which operated as a subsidiary of the MOF since its
creation in October 1954 and then was removed from the administrative
control of the MOF and tasked to manage transactions related to fixed
investment in October 1979. The last was the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (“ICBC”), which was formed in January 1984 to manage
the commercial transactions of the PBOC.
Given their magnitude in China’s financial system,57 the four stateowned banks, later known as the “Big Four,”58 have always been the focus
of financial reform, and they appear to undergo an overhaul every ten
years.59 In 1994, the government created three new policy banks—the
Agricultural Development Bank, the China Development Bank, and the
Export-Import Bank—which were expected to assume the responsibility
for policy lending, relieving the Big Four of the obligation to extend loans
for these purposes. In 1995, China enacted the Commercial Bank Law,
which laid the legal foundation for the commercialization of state-owned
banks by, for example, mandating that banks should be responsible for
their own profits and losses, as well as stipulating technical requirements,
such as capital-adequacy ratios in line with international banking
practice. Another round of banking reforms was launched in 2004, which
ultimately led to the limited privatization of the Big Four though the
recruitment of strategic investors and listing on stock exchanges. 60

57. For example, by the end of 1997, the Big Four controlled 70.1% of China’s total financial
assets. Nicholas R. Lardy, State-Owned Banks in China, in THE FUTURE OF STATE-OWNED
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 93 (Gerard Caprio, Jonathan L. Fiechter, Robert E. Litan & Michael
Pomerleano eds., 2004). However, their share has decreased significantly in recent years. By the
end of 2015, the Big Four, together with the Bank of Communication, held 39.2% of total assets of
China’s banking sector. See THE CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION (CBRC), 2015
ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2016), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhjs/zjhnb/201610/P020161012
641106288538.pdf.
58. The “Big Four” refers to the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Xu & Gui, An Empirical
Examination, supra note 11, at 187.
59. Certainly, the government still enacted important reforms during these ten-year intervals.
See, e.g., Lardy, supra note 57, at 101. For example, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the
government undertook a number of organizational and regulatory reforms designed to encourage
state-owned banks to operate on a more commercial basis.
60. The CCB was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in October 2005 and the Shanghai
Stock Exchange in September 2007; the BOC was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in
June 2006 and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 2006; the ICBC was listed on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange simultaneously in October 2006; the ABC
was listed on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange in July 2010.
See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 54.
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In the mid-1980s, the state began to increase competition in the
financial sector by allowing the entry of new financial institutions,
including new commercial banks and non-bank financial entities. By the
end of 2015, there were twelve so-called joint-stock banks,61 which
controlled 18.6% of China’s total banking assets.62 Most of these banks,
despite their joint-stock status, remained indirectly controlled by the
government, as their largest shareholders are usually SOEs. Although
most of the large shareholders of joint-stock banks are still SOEs, there
is a significant difference in the intensity of state control and the
procedure of nominating the governor between joint-stock banks and
state-owned banks (Big Four).63 In other words, the two bank types have
different governance structures. Empirical evidence shows that between
1998 and 2005, the return on assets (“ROA”) and return on equity
(“ROE”) of joint-stock banks and city commercial banks were always
higher than the Big Four; in addition, the former showed consistently
higher annual total asset growth rates than the latter.64 Jia further shows
“that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by
joint-stock banks.”65 Other studies, such as Shih, Zhang, and Liu; 66 Ariff
and Can;67 Lin and Zhang;68 Jiang, Yao, and Zhang;69 Berger, Hasan, and
Zhou;70 and Jiang, Yao, and Feng also confirm the better performance of
joint-stock banks (and city commercial banks) relative to state-owned
banks.71 However, more recent research shows that the profit efficiency
of state-owned banks improved significantly from 2004 to 2013, and it is
61. See CBRC, supra note 57, at 26, 187, 194, 204. The CBRC classifies the Bank of
Communication, another joint-stock bank, as a “large commercial bank,” similar to the Big Four.
62. See id. at 26.
63. Chunxin Jia, The Effect of Ownership on the Prudential Behavior of Banks―The Case of
China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 77, 79 (2009).
64. Giovanni Ferri, Are New Tigers Supplanting Old Mammoths in China’s Banking System?
Evidence from a Sample of City Commercial Banks, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 131, 133-135 (2009).
65. See Jia, supra note 63, at 77.
66. See generally Victor Shih, Qi Zhang & Mingxing Liu, Comparing the Performance of
Chinese Banks: A Principal Component Approach, 18 CHINA ECON. REV. 15 (2007).
67. See generally Mohamed Ariff & Luc Can, Cost and Profit Efficiency of Chinese Banks:
A Non-Parametric Analysis, 19 CHINA ECON. REV. 260 (2008).
68. See generally Xiaochi Lin & Yi Zhang, Bank Ownership Reform and Bank Performance
in China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 20 (2009).
69. See generally Chunxia Jiang, Shujie Yao & Zongyi Zhang, The Effect of Governance
Changes on Bank Efficiency in China: A Stochastic Distance Function Approach, 20 CHINA ECON.
REV. 717 (2009).
70. See generally Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan & Mingming Zhou, Bank Ownership and
Efficiency in China: What Will Happen in the World’s Largest Nation?, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 113
(2009).
71. See generally Chunxia Jiang, Shujie Yao & Genfu Feng, Bank Ownership, Privatization,
and Performance: Evidence from a Transition Country, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3364 (2013).
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actually slightly higher than that of joint-stock banks (and much higher
than that of foreign banks).72
The only genuinely private bank among these twelve banks is the
China Minsheng Bank.73 In addition, by the end of 2015, there were 133
city commercial banks, converted from urban credit cooperatives that
were approaching a systemic bankruptcy in the middle of the 1990s,
which held 11.4% of the total banking assets.
Meanwhile, in 2015, China had 859 rural commercial banks,
seventy-one rural cooperative banks, 1,373 rural credit cooperatives, one
postal savings bank, four banking asset management firms, forty locally
incorporated foreign banking institutions, Sino-German Bausparkasse,
sixty-eight trust companies, 224 finance companies owned by corporate
groups, forty-seven financial leasing companies, five money brokerage
firms, twenty-five auto financing companies, twelve consumer finance
companies, 1,311 village or township banks, fourteen lending companies,
and forty-eight rural mutual cooperatives. Overall, there were 4,262
banking institutions, hiring 3.8 million employees and holding financial
assets of CNY 199.3 trillion.74 It can therefore be argued that today
China’s financial system is much more diversified and competitive than
it was before.
2. Financial Markets
Compared with its banking sector, China’s financial markets,
including both stock and bond markets, are far less developed and
significant. Following their creation in 1990, China’s domestic stock
exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (“SHSE”) and the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange (“SZSE”), grew quickly but unsteadily. 75 At the end of
72. See generally Dong, Yizhe, Firth, Michael, Hou, Wenxuan & Weiwei Yang, 2016.
“Evaluating the Performance of Chinese Commercial Banks: A Comparative Analysis of Different
Types of Banks”, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 252: 280-295.
73. By the end of 2015, in addition to the Minsheng Bank, five more private banks had
obtained operating permits, and their total asset volume reached CNY 79.432 billion. Furthermore,
private capital is reported to account for 53% in city commercial banks, around 90% in rural
cooperative financial institutions, and over 72% in village and township banks. See CBRC, supra
note 57, at 42-44.
74. CBRC, supra note 57, at 25-26.
75. The market continued its growth in most of the 1990s and reached a peak by the end of
2000, but then suffered a long-run decline that lasted for more than five years. The subsequent
recovery finally led to another boom, culminating in 2007, followed by another bust. The bumpy
development of stock markets seems to be at odds with China’s continuous and stable economic
growth. For example, between mid-2001 and mid-2005, China’s GDP increased by more than 50%,
but the total stock market capitalization decreased by more than 50%. For a more comprehensive
investigation on the growth history of China’s stock markets, see Zhong Zhang, Law and Finance:
The Case of Stock Market Development in China, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 283, 304 (2016).
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2015, 2,827 companies were listed on the SHSE and the SZSE, and the
total market capitalization reached CNY 53.15 trillion, equivalent to
78.54% of GDP in the fiscal year 2015.76 By the same year, the SHSE
and the SZSE were the fourth and fifth largest exchanges in the world,
respectively, in terms of market capitalization.77
Stock markets play only a complementary role in financing China’s
economic growth despite their fast development. For example, according
to a recent report issued by the PBOC,78 by the end of February 2017, the
ratio of non-financial institutions’ equity sales to total social financing
was 3.7%,79 whereas the ratio of domestic bank loans to total social
financing was 67.5%. The performance of China’s stock markets also
seems to be lackluster. Allen and Qian compare the performance,
measured by the “buy-and-hold” return in the periods of January 1992 to
December 2013, of the major stock exchanges around the world and find
that the performance of the value-weighted SHSE index is below that of
the DAX (Germany), S&P 500 (US), FTSE (UK), CAC (France), and
only slightly better than the Nikkei Index (Japan).80 After adjusting for
inflation, by the end of 2013, the real return from investing in the valueweighted SHSE index was at about the same level as at the start of 1992.
Finally, China’s stock markets have always suffered from certain

76. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Annual Report 2015, available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhjs/zjhnb/201610/P020161012641106288538.pdf
(accessed 18, March, 2017).
77. Id.
78. ZHONGGUOÓ RENMIN YINHANG (中国人民银行) [PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA], 2017
NIAN 2 YUESHEHUI RONGZI GUIMO CUNLIANG TONGJISHUJU BAOGAO (2017年2月社会融资规模
存量统计数据报告) [REPORT ON THE STOCKS OF TOTAL SOCIAL FINANCING IN FEBRUARY 2017]
(Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3268798/index.html.
79. Total social financing is an indicator used by the PBOC to measure the total amount of
money that the real economy obtains from the financial system in a certain period of time (a month,
a quarter, or a year). It mainly comprises CNY loans from banks, foreign currency loans, entrusted
loans, trust loans, bank acceptance bills, corporate bonds, non-financial institutions’ equity sales,
etc. See, e.g., Qiang Xiaoji, PBOC Plans to Redefine Total Social Financing, CHINA DAILY (Feb.
10, 2011), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-02/10/content_11986819—.htm; Lu
Jianxin & Pete Sweeney, FACTBOX – What is China’s Total Social Financing Indicator?,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 13, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-13/news/sns-rtchina-tsf-factboxl3e8m24an-20121112_1_central-bank-yuan-loans-interest-rates.
80. Franklin Allen & Jun “QJ” Qian, China’s Financial System and the Law, 47 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 499, 526 (2014).
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institutional weaknesses, such as large-scale speculative trading,81 pricing
inefficiency,82 and pervasive misconduct and law-breaking.83
The underdevelopment of the bond market—especially the
corporate bond market—relative to the banking sector, further diminishes
the role played by direct financing in serving the economy. The largest
component of the bond market is the government bond. Compared to the
market for government-issued bonds, the size of the corporate bond
market is minuscule: in terms of the amount of outstanding bonds at the
end of 2008, the corporate bond market is less than one-fourth the size of
the government bond market.84 The development of China’s bond
markets has accelerated since 2008, partly as the aftermath of China’s
fiscal stimulus package of 2009 (an issue that will be discussed in detail
in Section V). However, the relative underdevelopment of the corporate
bond market seems to have remained unchanged. For example, by the end
of 2015, corporate bonds accounted for only 5.4% of the total volume of
bonds that were issued on the inter-bank bond market, which accounted
for more than 90% of China’s bond issuance, whereas that ratio for
government bonds (treasury bonds plus local government bonds) was
34.62%.85 In addition, the development of China’s bond markets faces
other obstacles, such as a lack of sound accounting and auditing systems
and high-quality bond-rating agencies, as well as the lack of a wellconstructed yield curve.86
B. Features of Financial Repression in China
In general, after four decades of reform and development, China’s
financial system has been fundamentally changed. On the surface, China
has virtually all the institutions of a modern financial system: a central
bank in charge of setting monetary policy, a diversified banking system
81. See generally Allen & Qian, supra note 80.
82. Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Wayne Yu, The Information Content of Stock Markets:
Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215
(2000); Karen J. Lin, Khondkar E. Karim & Clairmont Carter, Why Does China’s Stock Market
Have Highly Synchronous Stock Price Movements? An Information Supply Perspective, 31
ADVANCES ACC. 68 (2015).
83. Allen et al., supra note 54, at 26; William T. Allen & Han Shen, Assessing China’s TopDown Securities Markets, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 149, 169 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall Morck
eds., 2012); Zhang, supra note 75, at 286-87.
84. Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian, Chenying Zhang & Mengxin Zhao, China’s Financial
System: Opportunities and Challenges, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 97, 101 (Joseph P.H. Fan &
Randall Morck eds., 2012).
85. See 2015 nian zhongguo zhaiquan shichang gaikuang (2015年中国债券市场概况)
[China’s Bond Market Overview 2015], https://www.chinabond.com.cn/cb/eng/zqsc/jwtzzzl/scjs/
20170615/147550684.shtml.
86. Allen et al., supra note 84, at 101.
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that consists of, for example, commercial and policy banks, and a capital
market on which over 2,000 companies are listed. However, by nature,
China’s financial system is heavily repressed. The main features of this
financial repression are the following: (1) the banking sector is dominated
by state ownership; (2) credit allocation is determined more by political
factors than by profitability considerations; and (3) interest rates are
controlled by the government.87 According to Huang and Wang,88
“China’s degree of financial repression was higher than not only the
average of middle-income countries but also the average of the lowincome countries.”89 In fact, among all ninety-one countries with
available data, China ranked fourth in 2005. Consequently, China’s
financial system is claimed to be “both distorting China’s growth and
holding it back.”90 And, it is considered the economy’s “Achilles’ heel.”91
The three specific features of the financial repression in China will now
be reviewed in turn in more detail.
1. Dominance of State Ownership in the Banking Sector
China has the highest level of state ownership of banks of any major
economy in the world. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine report that
by the end of 2001, whereas eighty-seven countries had some government
ownership of banks, the percentage of bank assets at government-owned
banks exceeded 50% in only fifteen countries, and China was identified
as having the highest level of government ownership (98% of banks
assets were held by state-owned banks).92 This situation has not been
significantly changed by China’s financial development. Deng et al.
claim that eighteen of the twenty largest banks are directly state87. In addition to state ownership, credit misallocation, and interest rate controls that will be
discussed in this paper, there are other dimensions of China’s financial repression policy, which is
beyond the scope of this study. For example, China’s currency policy has always been criticized
for its pursuit of mercantile advantage by devaluing the RMB and hence stimulating exports.
MORRIS GOLDSTEIN & NICHOLAS R. LARDY, DEBATING CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
(2008). An inflexible exchange rate, in turn, requires a large set of distortionary policies for its
maintenance over long periods. Eswar S. Prasad, Is the Chinese Growth Miracle Built to Last?, 20
CHINA ECON. REV. 103, 114-15 (2009).
88. Yiping Huang & Xu Wang, Building an Efficient Financial System in China: A Need for
Stronger Market Discipline (JCER AEPR Series, Working Paper No. 2016-2-1, 2016).
89. Id.
90. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, PUTTING CHINA’S CAPITAL TO WORK: THE VALUE OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM (2006), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%
20Insights/China/Putting%20Chinas%20capital%20to%20work/MGI_Putting_Chinas_capital_to
_work_Full_Report.ashx.
91. Wendy Dobson & Anil K. Kashyap, The Contradiction in China’s Gradualist Banking
Reforms, 37 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 103, 103 (2006).
92. BARTH ET AL., supra note 27, at 148-149.
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controlled and,93 at the end of 2009, accounted for CNY 58.58 trillion, or
approximately 73% of total bank assets.94 Naughton reports that, by 2014,
the Chinese government controlled at least 85% of banking sector
assets.95
State-owned banks are inherently prone to being unproductive
because government ownership tends to politicize resource allocation. In
other words, state ownership of banks facilitates the financing of
politically attractive projects but does not necessarily do the same for
economically efficient projects. In addition, state ownership can lead to a
conflict of incentives: governments are exposed to an incentive conflict
when they have significant state ownership, as one part of government is
then charged with monitoring another, most likely leading to weak
official supervision.
China is not an exception to the “bad state-owned bank” story.
Notwithstanding some significant institutional changes, such as
corporatization and public listings, China’s state-owned banks for the
most part continue to be governed as before, by the Chinese Communist
Party (hereinafter “the Party”)96 acting as the paramount authority with
regard to the overall strategic direction and directorate or executive
appointments.97 With the dominance of state ownership and the
omnipresence of the Party’s control, the ostensibly international-rulebased corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors,
93. Yongheng Deng, Randall Morck, Jing Wu & Bernard Yeung, China’s Pseudo-monetary
Policy, 19 REV. FINANCE 55, 67 (2015).
94. Three policy banks remain fully and directly owned by the state and are intended as tools
for state intervention in the economy. The Big Four were corporatized and subsequently listed but
have long histories of state control with the MOF and Central Huijin Investment Ltd. holding
sufficient equity blocks to lock in state control. A total of eleven of the joint-stock banks have a
central SOE, local SOE, or subnational government organization as their largest shareholder. Id.
95. Barry Naughton, Is China Socialist?, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 8 (2017).
96. Katharina Pistor, The Governance of China’s Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA 35, 4143 (Joseph P.H. Fan & Randall Morck eds., 2012). The author generalizes that, within China, the
Party continues to be recognized as an integral part of a dual power structure, where the state
apparatus and the Party form two separate but inter-linked hierarchies that use different
mechanisms of control. Whereas the state is associated with control rights exercised by way of
ownership and administrative lines of control, the Party controls the career paths of individuals in
the Party, the state, and organizations that are critical to the Party or the state. More specifically,
the Party’s Central Organization Department (“COD”) exercises the power to appoint senior
executives of China’s national state supervisory organs, such as the PBOC and the CBRC, and
major national financial institutions, such as the Big Four or the three policy banks. For a more
detailed discussion on the influence and operational process of the Party, see RICHARD
MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 140 (2010).
97. Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 141 (Min Zhu, Jinqing Cai & Martha Avery
eds., 2009).
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cannot be expected to act as independently and professionally as their
counterparts in developed economies.98 The top executives in Chinese
state-owned banks must be confronted with two different and often
conflicting missions: to advance the government’s political objectives
and to optimize the bank’s financial performance. When these two
missions contradict each other, the former always dominates. Walter,
therefore, contends that “to the extent that the banks lend in line with
government direction, they should be seen as part of the national fiscal
system; they are policy banks, not commercial banks.”99 Similarly, Gruin
argues that “the chairman of the big banks cannot be said to be real
bankers. They are politicians.”100
In addition to the aforementioned “policy burden” or “multitasking”
problem, China’s state-owned banks have been further criticized for a
lack of effective internal risk management and control systems, for
weakness in information collection, data analysis, and credit assessment,
and for their failure to integrate their local branches into unified national
systems.101 These weaknesses can be further attributed to the banks’ state
ownership, which creates a moral hazard problem for the banks, as they
ultimately are not accountable for the losses resulting from the loans they
have extended and, therefore, have little incentive to develop skills and
expertise in credit evaluation.102

98. Charles C.L. Kwong, China’s Banking Reform: The Remaining Agenda, 40 GLOBAL
ECON. REV. 161, 168-172 (2011) (arguing that neither independent directors nor foreign investors
can play meaningful roles in the corporate governance of the Big Four); Xianhang Qian, Guangli
Zhang & Haiming Liu, Officials on Boards and the Prudential Behavior of Banks: Evidence from
China’s City Commercial Banks, 32 CHINA ECON. REV. 84, 89 (2015) (reporting that, in a sample
of China’s city commercial banks from 2006 to 2010, those banks with officials as directors had
higher loan-asset and loan-deposit ratios and lower excess reserve ratios, representing poor
prudential behavior). But see Qi Liang, Pisun Xu & Pornsit Jiraporn, Board Characteristics and
Chinese Bank Performance, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 2953, 2966 (2013) (finding that the number of
board meetings and the proportion of independent directors have significant positive impact on
both bank performance and asset quality, while board size has a significantly negative impact on
bank performance).
99. Carl E. Walter, China and Its Financial System: What Could Go Wrong?, 30 CFA INST.
CONF. PROC. Q. 18 (2013).
100. Julian Gruin, Asset or Liability? The Role of the Financial System in the Political Economy
of China’s Rebalancing, 42 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 73, 78 (2013).
101. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 90. It is therefore not uncommon to find
misappropriation and fraud in China’s banking sector. For example, in June 2006, China’s National
Audit Office announced that an examination of records at the ABC, one of the Big Four, uncovered
51 cases of criminal wrongdoing involving 157 people in 2004. The state audit also found evidence
of $1.8 billion in improperly handled deposits and $3.5 billion in illegal loans. See Peter S.
Goodman, China Discloses $1.1 Billion Bank Fraud, WASH. POST (June 28, 2006), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/27/AR2006062700584.html?noredirect=on.
102. Dobson & Kashyap, supra note 91, at 115.
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The behavior—poor management and operation—of China’s stateowned banks is found to have changed very little after several rounds of
reform. For example, using Chinese provincial data from 1991 to 1997,
Park and Sehrt find that economic fundamentals, such as industrial
growth, agricultural growth, and GDP per capita, have had little effect on
total lending by state banks, whereas the responsiveness of lending to
policy concerns, such as SOEs’ output, is significant. 103 Based on data
from 1997 to 2004, Podpiera reports that the pricing of credit risk by
state-owned banks remains undifferentiated and that bank lending
decisions continue to be driven by the availability of funds and do not
appear to consider enterprise profitability. 104 The inefficiency, the low
profitability, and a lack of caution in credit issuance of state-owned banks
is further confirmed by numerous subsequent studies that use more recent
data, particularly when compared with the joint-stock banks and city
commercial banks.105
2. Misallocation of Credit
Another serious weakness in China’s banking sector is the failure of
financial intermediaries to channel credit to the most productive regions,
industries, and enterprises. Scarce financial resources have been
systematically and continually allocated to less profitable but more
103. Albert Park & Kaja Sehrt, Tests of Financial Intermediation and Banking Reform in
China, 29 J. COMP. ECON. 608, 627-632 (2001).
104. Richard Podpiera, Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior
Changed? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/71, 2006), https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Progress-in-Chinas-Banking-Sector-Reform-Has-BankBehavior-Changed-18952.
105. Xiaoqing Fu & Shelagh Heffernan, Cost X-efficiency in China’s Banking Sector, 18
CHINA ECON. REV. 35, 47-50 (2007); Shih et al., supra note 66; Ariff & Can, supra note 67; Ferri,
supra note 64; Jia, supra note 63; Lin & Zhang, supra note 68; Jiang et al., supra note 69; Berger
et al., supra note 70; Jiang et al., supra note 71. However, there are also studies showing that the
performance of state-owned banks has improved after China’s financial reform. See, e.g., Michael
Firth, Chen Lin, Ping Liu & Sonia M.L. Wong, Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in
China’s Private Sector, 33 J. BANKING & FINANCE 1145 (2009) (finding that banks tend to allocate
loans to firms with higher profitability, more experienced and incentive-compatible CEOs, and
more independent corporate boards, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in
loan-extension decisions); Ying-Ju Tsai, Yi-Pei Chen, Chi-Ling Lin & Jung-Hua Huang, The Effect
of Banking System Reform on Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity: Evidence from China, 46 J.
BANKING & FIN. 166, 172 (2014) (reporting that, after China’s banking system reform, statecontrolled listed companies are less likely to rely on bank loans for investment because of the
increased monitoring, and non-state-controlled listed companies are able to obtain bank loans more
easily because the lending practices of banks have become more commercially-oriented); Cheng
Hsiao, Yan Shen & Wenlong Bian, Evaluating the Effectiveness of China’s Financial Reform-The
Efficiency of China’s Domestic Banks, CHINA ECON. REV. 35: 70, 81 (2015) (showing that the
operating efficiency of Chinese domestic banks, including the Big Four, is catching up with that of
foreign banks).
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politically preferable entities, especially SOEs, whereas private firms,
which have become the driving force of China’s economic growth, are
forced to rely on informal and even underground credit channels to
finance their survival. According to Huang,106 there is “a systemic,
pervasive, persistent bias in financial policies in favor of the least
efficient firms in the Chinese economy—SOEs—at the expense of the
most efficient firms in the Chinese economy—China’s small,
entrepreneurial, and private enterprises.” Similarly, Nee and Opper argue
that “the lending policy and practices of China’s formal financial
institutions were designed to deter, if not entirely block, the rise of the
private enterprise economy.”107
After several decades of economic reform, China’s non-state sector
has replaced SOEs as the key driver of China’s economic growth.
However, the non-state sector, especially private enterprises,108 has been
intentionally discriminated against in terms of credit access and
availability. For example, Huang uses the World Bank’s “World Business
Environment Survey (‘WBES’) 2000”109 to show that “domestic private
firms in China are among the most financially constrained in the world.”
110
In response to a survey question that assessed the extent of the “general
financing constraint” (“GFC”), a measure of the perception of the
severity of credit constraints, WBES found that 66.3% of Chinese firms
considered the GFC to be a “major obstacle.” That proportion is the
highest among Asian countries and exceeds the proportion in most
transitional economies, including Russia. A survey conducted by the
International Finance Corporation that covered 338 domestic private
firms located in Beijing, Chengdu, Shunde, and Wenzhou, reports that
approximately 80% of the firms surveyed considered access to financing
a moderate or major constraint, while 40% considered it a major
constraint.111
106. Yashen Huang, Do Financing Biases Matter for the Chinese Economy?, 26 CATO J. 283,
289 (2006).
107. VICTOR NEE & SONJA OPPER, CAPITALISM FROM BELOW: MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 96 (2012).
108. For the relationship between the non-state sector and the private sector, see Stephan
Haggard & Yasheng Huang, The Political Economy of Private-Sector Development in China, in
CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 337, 339 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds.,
2008).
109. “The survey was carried out in 81 countries and for over 10,000 firms operating in these
countries. The survey was designed to capture the firms’ views on many aspects of the business
environment pertaining to their operations. An important feature of the WBES is its emphasis on
entrepreneurial firms. The vast majority of the firms are owned privately.” Id. at 290-91.
110. Huang, supra note 106, at 290.
111. NEIL GREGORY, STOYAN TENEV & DILEEP WAGLE, CHINA’S EMERGING PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CENTURY 41 (2000).
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Regarding the distribution of credit volume, Brandt and Zhu find
that from 1998 to 2004, the state sector, defined to include shareholding
companies in which governments have significant ownership shares,
continued to absorb between half and two-thirds of new bank lending.112
According to the Report on the Development of Private Economy in
China 2008-2009, the narrow private sector, i.e., domestic privately
owned and individual businesses, accounted for only 7.4% to 13.5% of
the total bank loans issued from 2002 to 2008.113
The argument that the private sector is financially disfavored in
China is further supported by certain statistical evidence. For example,
Brandt and Li find that compared with township and village enterprises
(“TVEs”), which are “set up and owned by local township governments,”
private firms (as well as later privatized TVEs) were “significantly less
A survey conducted in 2000 shows a similar picture. “The survey questions were answered by
the owners of the private enterprises. Of particular interest to this study is that private entrepreneurs
were asked to indicate the degree of difficulty in obtaining bank loans using a scale between 1 and
5, with 1 being the easiest access and 5 the most difficult. In total, 2,854 out of 3,073 entrepreneurs
answered this question, and the percentages of entrepreneurs choosing 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were 2.59,
12.02, 22.07, 32.13 and 31.19%, respectively.” Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu & Zhigang Tao,
Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China,
14 ECON. TRANSITION 611, 614 (2006).
112. Loren Brandt & Xiaodong Zhu, China’s Banking Sector and Economic Growth, in
CHINA’S FINANCIAL TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADs 22, 86 (Charles W. Calomiris ed., 2007).
113. Guangdong Xu & Binwei Gui, Why are China’s State-Owned Enterprises so Profitable?
A Financial Repression Perspective, in MARKET INTEGRATION: THE EU EXPERIENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM IN CHINA, 150 (Niels Philipsen, Stefan E. Weishaar &
Guangdong Xu eds., 2016). The financial discrimination against private enterprises appears to have
continued or even worsened after 2008, when the Chinese government adopted a gigantic stimulus
plan, which favors infrastructural projects as well as other local-government-sponsored projects.
See Risto Herrala & Yandong Jia, Toward State Capitalism in China?, 14 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS
163, 172 (2015) (reporting that the credit availability of SOEs, particularly those SOEs owned by
local governments, increased significantly from 2004 to 2011); Anders C. Johansson & Xunan
Feng, The State Advances, the Private Sector Retreats? Firms Effects of China’s Great Stimulus
Programme, 40 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1635, 1647 (2016) (finding that SOEs are better able to
maintain their leverage levels and have better access to both short- and long-term debt compared
with private firms after the introduction of the stimulus program); Ivan Roberts & Andrew
Zurawski, Changing Patterns of Corporate Leverage in China: Evidence from Listed Companies,
in 1 CHINA’S NEW SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 271 (Ligang Song, Ross Garnaut, Fang Cai,
& Lauren Johnston eds., 2016) (showing that the leverage of listed state-owned or state-controlled
companies has risen relative to that of private firms after 2008).
But see NICHOLAS R. LARDY, SUSTAINING CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AFTER THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS 35-36 (2012) (reporting that in 2009 and 2010, bank lending to small-scale
enterprises expanded by CNY 1.4 trillion and 1.7 trillion, respectively. In 2010, the pace of growth
of lending to small firms was more than twice as rapid as the growth of lending to large firms, and
the absolute amount of new lending to small firms exceeded that going to large firms. He therefore
concludes that “both individual businesses, which are entirely private, and small firms, which are
predominately private, were able to access a large share of the expanded supply of bank credit,
which was one of the most prominent features of China’s stimulus program starting in late 2008.”).
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likely to obtain loans, received smaller loans, and were subject to higher
loan standards.”114 Li, Yue, and Zhao report that for unlisted
manufacturing firms in China, “state ownership is significantly and
positively associated with” a firm’s likelihood of having long-term debt
(but not short-term debt), as well as a higher leverage ratio.115 Based on a
data set covering more than 20,000 Chinese firms over the 1998 to 2005
period, Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche find that private firms
significantly relied on their cash flow to finance their investment,116
which is evidence of credit constraints, whereas SOEs did not. 117
Moreover, Boyreau-Debray and Wei show that state-owned financial
institutions tended “to allocate capital systematically away from more
productive regions toward less productive ones” in favor of inefficient
SOEs,118 which played a more important role in the less productive
areas.119

114. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li, Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology,
Information, or Incentives?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 387, 391, 409 (2003).
115. Kai Li, Heng Yue & Longkai Zhao, Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure:
Evidence from China, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 471 (2009).
116. Sandra Poncet, Walter Steingress & Hylke Vandenbussche, Financial Constraints in
China: Firm-Level Evidence, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 411, 416 (2010).
117. Alessandra Guariglia, Xiaoxuan Liu & Lina Song, Internal Finance and Growth:
Microeconometric Evidence on Chinese Firms, 96 J. DEV. ECON. 79 (2011). The authors use a
similar methodology and show that, in addition to private firms’ investment, the growth of their
assets is also affected by cash flow (again, SOEs are immune to such constraints). The conclusion
reached in Poncet et al., supra note 116, is further supported by Sai Ding, Alessandra Guariglia &
John Knight, Investment and Financing Constraints in China: Does Working Capital Management
Make a Difference?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1490, 1498 (2013), where the authors find that, in the
presence of cash flow shocks, private firms—but not SOEs—have to adjust their working capital
to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed capital investment and therefore exhibit
high sensitivities of working capital investment to cash flow. See also Minjia Chen & Alessandra
Guariglia, Internal Financial Constraints and Firm Productivity in China: Do Liquidity and Export
Behavior Make a Difference?, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 1123 (2013) (confirming that private firms are
financially constrained, and reporting that private (and foreign) firms’ productivities are affected
by their cash flow, whereas SOEs’ are not); Kenneth S. Chan, Vinh Q.T. Dang & Isabel K.M. Yan,
Financial Reform and Financing Constraints: Some Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms, 23
CHINA ECON. REV. 482, 490 (2012) (finding that small firms’ investments display significant
sensitivity to internal funds (cash holdings), whereas large firms’ investments do not, which means
that small firms face significant credit constraints. Given that most small firms are privately owned,
the argument that private firms are financially disfavored is again corroborated).
118. Genevieve Boyreau-Debray & Shang-Jin Wei, Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial
System: The Case of China 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11214, 2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11214.pdf.
119. See also Jahangir Aziz & Christoph Duenwald, Growth-Financial Intermediation Nexus
in China 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/194, 2002), http://www.imf.org/
en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Growth-Financial-Intermediation-Nexus-in-China-15571
(showing that provinces with above-average GDP growth had significantly lower bank loan-toGDP ratios—by up to 36% of GDP—than below-average growth provinces; in addition, provinces
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3. Interest Rate Controls
The liberalization of interest rates in China is placed relatively late
in the sequence of economic reform, and it follows a gradual approach.
“The sequencing of interest rate liberalization was carefully crafted.” 120
The process involved the lifting of restrictions on wholesale transactions
followed by the gradual liberalization of retail transactions. The
progression of liberalization was as follows: deposit and lending interest
rates on foreign currencies were liberalized before those on the local
currency, loan rates were liberalized before deposits, and the
liberalization of long-term and large loans and deposits preceded shortterm and small loans and deposits. However, the policy of gradually
liberalizing interest rates on loans and deposits was largely abandoned
after 2004.121 Fortunately, “[s]ince 2012, interest rate liberalization has
been advancing at an accelerated pace.”122 “The lending rate floor, which
was expanded to 0.7 times the benchmark rate in 2012, was removed” in
July 2013. Starting then, “financial institutions could, in theory,
independently decide on lending rates based on market forces.” “From
November 2014 to October 2015, the deposit rate ceiling was gradually
increased three times and finally removed” on October 2015. The IMF,123
therefore, announced that “interest rate liberalization was formally
completed. . . . these reforms help move China towards an independent,
market-based, monetary policy.”124

with above-average concentrations of SOEs had higher loan-to-GDP ratios than provinces with
below-average concentrations of SOEs).
120. Bernard J. Laurens & Rodolfo Maino, China: Strengthening Monetary Policy
Implementation, 12 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/14, 2007); Xiaoling Wu,
China’s Monetary Policy: Facing the Challenges of Financial Globalization, in CHINA’S
EMERGING FIN. MKTS.: CHALLENGES & GLOBAL IMPACT 433 (Martha Avery, Min Zhu & Jinqing
Cai eds., 2009).
121. LARDY, supra note 113, at 2.
122. Yuyan Tan, Yang Ji & Yiping Huang, Completing China’s Interest Rate Liberalization,
24 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 1, 11 (2016).
123. INT’L MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REPORT, NO. 16/270, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2016 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (2016) [hereinafter IMF, COUNTRY
REPORT NO. 16/270].
124. However, Tan et al., supra note 122, at 2, caution that “the de jure completion of interest
rate liberalization has generated little impact on the Chinese financial system. First, commercial
banks still stick to the official benchmark rates set by the PBOC, although they are not required to
do so anymore, at least in theory. Both deposit rates and loan rates have stayed nearly the same as
those before reform. Without any real change in the pattern of financial institutions’ behavior, the
recent reforms have not yet put an end to financial repression. Second, the financing cost in the
informal market is still nearly twenty percent, much higher than the official benchmark rate, and
keeps rising even when the PBOC lowers both the benchmark interest rate and the required reserve
ratio (“RRR”). Because SOEs still have better access to credit while more efficient private
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Figure 1: The Nominal Interest Rates, GDP Deflators, and Real Interest Rates in
China (1978-2010) (Source: Xu & Gui) 125

What deserves more attention in this study is that China’s central
bank appears to adjust the benchmark interest rates asymmetrically in
response to inflation.126 More specifically, the central bank adjusts
deposit and lending rates downward more quickly than they adjust them
upward. When inflation increases, the rigidity of interest rates leads to
lower or even negative real interest rates (see figure 1). This trend is more
evident after 2004. For example, Lardy reports that “beginning in 2004[,]
whenever inflation picked up the central bank raised the nominal deposit
rates with a lag, and the upward adjustment was substantially less than
the increase in inflation. When inflation ebbed[,] the bank adjusted the
nominal deposit rate downward rather quickly.”127
C. Summary
Financial regulation in China shares several features with a financial
repression as it has been identified in the theoretical framework presented
in Section II. Historically, the grip of the government on the banking
system has always been very strong, and, even today, the state is a
enterprises have to incur much higher funding costs, there is no sign of diminishing distortion of
capital allocation.”
125. Xu & Gui, The Case of China, supra note 11, at 395; Xu & Gui, An Empirical
Examination, supra note 11, at 82.
126. M.-H. Liu, D. Margaritis & A. Tourani-Rad, Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Rigidity
in China, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 647 (2009).
127. LARDY, supra note 113, at 80.
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dominant player in the banking sector. The state-owned banks in China
show many inefficiencies, poor management, and poor performance.
Also, the financial market, more particularly stock and bond
markets, are relatively underdeveloped in China. Compared to other
economies, stock markets in China play a relatively minor role in
allocating capital and have shown several institutional weaknesses, such
as speculative trading.
A large state involvement in the banking sector also leads to
misallocation of credit to the disadvantage of private enterprises. Because
private enterprises have difficulties obtaining credit via the regular
financial system, a large secondary circuit—shadow banking—has
emerged.
Finally, in order to stimulate growth, interest rates have been
severely controlled by China’s central bank, leading to a relatively low
cost of capital in China.
IV. CHINA’S STIMULUS PROGRAM OF 2008
The global financial crisis of 2008 severely impaired China’s
economy: “The total export dropp[ed] from 136.7 billion USD in
Sept[ember] 2008 to 64.86 billion USD in Feb[ruary] 2009”;128 “given
that exports had comprised one-third of China’s GDP in value, the sharp
downturn in exports exerted a drag on GDP growth that was a stunning
negative 41% in 2009.”129 China’s GDP annualized growth rate,
therefore, dropped from 9.5% in the third quarter of 2008 to 6.4% in the
first quarter of 2009. As a response, the Chinese government announced
a tremendous fiscal stimulus program on November 5, 2008. On that date,
a State Council (China’s cabinet) meeting decided on the “CNY 4 trillion
stimulus program,” an amount equal to 12.5% of 2008 GDP,130 but to be
spent from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the end of 2010.
128. Zhuo Chen, Zhiguo He & Chun Liu, The Financing of Local Government in China:
Stimulus Loan Wanes and Shadow Banking Waxes 6 (NBER, Working Paper No. 23598, July 5,
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23598.pdf.
129. Christine Wong, The Fiscal Stimulus Programme and Public Governance Issues in China,
11 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 1, 3 (2011).
130. Min Ouyang & Yulei Peng, The Treatment-Effect Estimation: A Case Study of the 2008
Economic Stimulus Package of China, 188 J. ECONOMETRICS 545, 548 (2015) (“this package was
the biggest stimulus program in the world, equal to about three times size of the US effort.”). Wong
supra note 129, at 13 has reported that the actual implementation size of the Chinese stimulus
program was even bigger than the announced value due to the over-lending of the banks to local
governments. Wong argues that even a conservative estimate would place the stimulus program at
CNY 9.5 trillion, or 27% of GDP over the twenty-seven months from the fourth quarter of 2008
through the end of 2010. Id. This was 2.4 times the size of the announced stimulus package.
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Table 1. Sectoral Composition of China’s Stimulus Investment
transport and power infrastructure (railroads, roads,
37.5%
airports, electric grids)
rural village infrastructure

9.3%

environmental investment

5.3%

affordable housing

10.0%

technological innovation and restructuring

9.3%

health and education

3.8%

post-earthquake reconstruction

25.0%

Source: Wong131
At the core of the stimulus package is an investment program that
focuses on “seven priority areas: (1) [t]ransport and power infrastructure
(railroads, roads, airports, electricity grids); (2) post-earthquake
reconstruction; (3) rural village infrastructure; (4) environment, energy
efficiency and carbon emission reduction; (5) affordable housing; (6)
technological innovation and restructuring; and (7) health and
education.”132 “The weighting of these components went through some
adjustments during the implementation. Their final distribution is
presented in Table 1. For these investments, the central government
committed at the outset to funding CNY 1.18 trillion from the budget with
the remaining CNY 2.8 trillion to be financed by local governments,
enterprises, and banks.”133
The stimulus package seems to have worked effectively in boosting
China’s economic growth, at least in the short term. For example, Diao,
Zhang, and Chen estimate that China’s “GDP growth rate in 2009 could
have fallen to 2.9% without the stimulus package” and “the cumulative
GDP growth difference between the two scenarios”—with versus without
the stimulus program—”for 2009-15 is about CNY 76 trillion”—”which
131. Wong, supra note 129, at 6.
132. For other dimensions of the package, see Barry Naughton, Understanding the Chinese
Stimulus Package, 28 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (2009). See also Wong, supra note 129.
133. Wong, supra note 129, at 6. See also id. at 8 (“the central government input to the stimulus
totaled CNY 1.6 trillion (36% larger than the CNY 1.18 trillion envisioned at the start”)).
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is about three times China’s 2007 GDP.”134 Similarly, Ouyang and Peng
report “the stimulus package had raised the annual real GDP growth in
China by about 3.2%, but only temporarily” (for about two years).135
Unfortunately, both the liability side and the asset side of the
program have significant financial and economic weaknesses, which
ultimately led China to a volatile, inefficient, and highly risky growth
path. On the liability side, most investment projects were financed by
bank loans at the beginning and then by a shadow banking system after
2012, when the Chinese government attempted to control the exposure of
Chinese banks to default risks. Consequently, China now faces the
problems of extremely high levels of leverage in both corporate and
governmental sectors, a massive volume of debt that has been believed to
reach a critical point, and the rise and boom of a shadow banking system
that acts as a double-edged sword by both (partially) liberalizing the
financial sector and endangering the stability of the financial system
simultaneously. On the asset side, most investments are carried out by
SOEs, particularly by Local Government Financing Vehicles (“LGFVs”),
and concentrate mainly on low-yielding projects, such as infrastructure.
Therefore, efficiency in the allocation of financial resources is further
decreased, the default risks faced by the Chinese bank system have built
up in an accelerated speed, and the NPLs problem that troubled China’s
financial system for the entire 1990s is looming again. In summary, the
severity of financial repression in China has been greatly intensified by
the stimulus program, so much so that the possibility of a financial or
economic crisis has become much more real than ever before.
These points can be illustrated by focusing on the one hand on the
investments made especially by LGFVs, (A); on the other hand on the
debts undertaken by these local entities to finance these investments, (B).
The results of these increased investments combined with an increasing
number of debts by local entities have worsened the consequences of
financial repression.
A. Increased Investments by Local Authorities
LGFVs play a crucial role in implementing the stimulus program.
Because only 1.18 of 4 trillion comes out of the budget of the central
government, there is a huge financing gap for the local governments who
are asked to carry out the investment projects. In addition, according to
China’s Budget Law, local governments are required to keep a balanced
134. Xinshen Diao, Yumei Zhang & Kevin Z. Chen, The Global Recession and China’s
Stimulus Package, 23 CHINA ECON. REV. 1 (2012).
135. Ouyang & Peng, supra note 130, at 1.
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budget and are prohibited from borrowing by themselves.136 If a local
government needs to borrow, it has to resort to the MOF who will then
borrow and repay the debt on behalf of the local government.137
Therefore, local governments are forced and yet simultaneously
encouraged by the central government to use LGFVs to finance their
investment spending.138
The number of LGFVs has increased at an astonishingly high speed.
There were only twelve bond-issuing LGFVs before 2009, whereas this
number rose to 1,700 in 2013.139 If we also include those small LGFVs
that have never issued bonds, there were 7,170 LGFVs in June 2013.140
With the help of LGFVs, local governments now can borrow from banks
and invest in specific projects, such as infrastructure, and leave these
loans on the off-balance sheet. As reported by China’s National Audit
Office, most (approximately 60%) of local governments’ off-balancesheet expenditures (through LGFVs) went to infrastructure, including
municipal construction and transportation infrastructure.141
China has, therefore, experienced a period of unprecedentedly high
infrastructure investment. Shi and Huang report that the total investment
in infrastructure in 2009 was CNY 6.18 trillion, and this number rose to
136. China’s Budget Law was enacted in 1994 and revised in 2014. See Yusuan Fa (预算法)
[Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 22, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) 1994 P.R.C. Laws 20 [hereinafter 1994 P.R.C.
BudgetLaw], http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=8925&lib=law; Yusuan Fa (预算法) [Budget
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 22, 1994, amended Aug. 31, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 P.R.C. Budget
Law Amendment], http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=233287&lib=law.
137. For more detailed discussions on the fiscal relationship between the central government
and local governments and the role of the Budget Law, see Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh &
Zheng (Michael) Song, The Long Shadow of China’s Fiscal Expansion, 47 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 129 (2016); Haoyu Gao, Hong Ru & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Subnational Debt
of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus (May 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2801878; Chen et al., supra note 128.
138. See Chen et al., supra note 128, at 7 (showing how the central government orchestrated
the relaxation of regulation to encourage local governments’ investment). Legally, an LGFV is an
SOE with the corresponding local government as the only or dominant shareholder. A typical
arrangement would be that local governments would transfer ownership of land to an LGFV, and
the land would be used as collateral to borrow from banks (or shadow banks) as well as to issue
bonds. Bai et al., supra note 137, at 130, 142.
139. See Chen et al., supra note 128, at 8; Bai et al., supra note 137, at 145.
140. Bai et al., supra note 137, at 145. As cautioned by Gao et al., supra note 137, at 14, there
is no consensus regarding the definition of LGFVs or the number of LGFVs, even among different
government apartments. For example, the PBOC estimates that there are approximately 10,000
LGFVs nationwide, whereas the CBRC reports that there are 9,828 LGFVs. Id. at 15.
141. Bai et al., supra note 137, at 132, 149 (also estimating that in 2014 and 2015, the offbalance-sheet spending by local governments accounted for approximately 11% of GDP, of which
2.4% was spent on local infrastructure projects and 8.6% on what are essentially private commercial
projects).
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CNY 7.2 trillion in 2010; and that “compared with 2008, the total
infrastructure investment in 2009 and 2010 increased by 45% and 63%,
respectively, higher than the two historical records in China since 1985:
36% in 1992 and 37% in 1998.”142 Nevertheless, there are concerns that
these projects may not be financially viable.143 Indeed, Ansar et al.
investigated ninety-five road and rail transport infrastructure projects
built in China from 1984 to 2008 and found that over half the projects,
55%, have been NPV (Net Present Value) negative.144 In other words, a
majority of the infrastructure projects are value-destroying. Given the
greater volume of projects and the undue haste in the process of project
approval in the 2008 stimulus program, the situation after 2008 may
prove to be worse.145
Investments by LGFVs may undermine China’s economic
efficiency not only directly by wasting resources on unproductive
infrastructure projects but also indirectly by crowding out private
investment projects that are more productive. For example, Huang,
Pagano, and Panizza report that between 2006 and 2013,146 local
government debt was inversely correlated with the city-level investment
ratio of domestic private manufacturing firms. In other words, local

142. Hao Shi & Shaoqing Huang, How Much Infrastructure Is Too Much? A New Approach
and Evidence from China, 5 WORLD DEV. 272, 272 (2014).
143. See Wilkins & Andrew Zurawski, Infrastructure Investment in China, RES. BANK AUSTL.
BULL., June 2014, at 27, 33, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2014/jun/pdf/bu-0614-4.
pdf (“around 85 percent of infrastructure investment in China is undertaken by the state—a much
higher percentage than is typical in other countries. In the absence of a strong framework of project
prioritization and transparent cost-benefit analysis, the reliance on government-directed investment
creates the potential for misallocation of resources through inefficient investment. Despite making
progress towards broader economic reform, the lack of market price mechanisms in many types of
infrastructure industries increases the risk of poor investment decisions.”).
144. Atif Ansar, Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier & Daniel Lunn, Does Infrastructure
Investment Lead to Economic Growth of Economic Fragility? Evidence from China, 32 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 360, 376 (2016).
145. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the effects of these infrastructure investments on
economic growth are mixed. See, e.g., Yingying Shi, Shen Guo & Puyang Sun, The Role of
Infrastructure in China’s Regional Economic Growth, 49 J. ASIAN ECON. 26, 27 (2017) (finding
that, for the period 1990-2013, whereas infrastructure has generally played a positive role in
China’s rapid economic growth, the contribution varies greatly across types of infrastructure.
Certain infrastructure investment, for example in roadways, is shown to have been negatively
related to growth in some regions and during some time periods). See also Shi & Huang, supra note
142, at 284 (arguing that China’s stimulus program of 2008 has led to a problem of over-investment
in infrastructure, particularly in China’s western provinces). China may therefore suffer an
economic loss that is equivalent to 3.2% of GDP in 2011.
146. Yi Huang, Marco Pagano & Ugo Panizza, Public Debt and Private Firm Funding:
Evidence from Chinese Cities 1, 1-2 (Centre for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. DP11489,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834826.

XU & FAURE (FINAL_FOR_JCI) (DO NOT DELETE)

34

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

10/28/2019 2:07 PM

[Vol. 42:1

government debt crowds out investment by private firms by tightening
their funding constraints.
In addition to LGFVs, traditional SOEs are also mobilized to
borrow, to invest, and, therefore, to revitalize China’s economy. New
credit under the stimulus program is allocated noticeably more toward
SOEs than to private firms.147 Cong et al. report that between 2000 and
2008,148 SOEs experienced between 12% and 50% lower levels of new
loans as a share of their revenues as compared with private enterprises;
however, after 2009, SOEs experienced, on average, between 10% and
15% higher levels of new loans as a share of their revenues. Herrala and
Jia find that the credit availability of SOEs, particularly those SOEs
owned by local governments, increased significantly from 2004 to
2011.149 Shen, Firth, and Poon report that from the fourth quarter of 2008
to the fourth quarter of 2010, the leverage of large firms and SOEs
increased by 2.97% and 2.38%, respectively, compared with leverage in
the pre-stimulus period.150 By contrast, the leverage ratios in small firms
and non-SOEs dropped by 1.21% and 1.22%, respectively, during the
same period.151
Bolstered by new loans, SOEs promptly expanded their fixed asset
investment. Whereas before the stimulus program private firms were the
major force behind aggregate investment spending in China, this pattern
has changed dramatically after 2008.152 Wen and Wu report that the real
growth rate of SOEs’ fixed investment spending increased from a normal
growth rate of 11.59% in the second quarter of 2008 to 21.09% in the
fourth quarter of 2008 and reached an astonishing 45.3% in the second

147. Yasheng Huang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus, 11 ASIA POL’Y 1, 4 (2011)
(estimating that 90% of the stimulus funds have been directed toward SOEs. The author, therefore,
concludes that “China is now in the midst of one of the most statist periods in its reform era with
the massive stimulus package that has poured a huge portion of the country’s GDP in financial
resources into the state sector.”).
148. Lin William Cong, Haoyu Gao, Jacopo Ponticelli & Xiaoguang Yang, Credit Allocation
under Economic Stimulus: Evidence from China (Buffett Inst. Global Poverty Res. Lab, Working
Paper No. 17-108, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126489.
149. Herrala & Jia, supra note 113, at 172.
150. Jianfu Shen, Michael Firth & Winnie P.H. Poon, Credit Expansion, Corporate Finance
and Overinvestment: Recent Evidence from China, 39 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 16, 22 (2016).
151. See Johansson & Feng, supra note 113, at 1647-1648 (reaching a similar conclusion that,
during the first three years after the initiation of the stimulus program, compared with SOEs that
were able to maintain their leverage levels, private firms deleveraged significantly more).
152. Deng et al., supra note 93, at 71 (reporting that, prior to 2008, nonfinancial SOEs’
annualized real growth rate in fixed asset investment typically lagged that of corporations officially
classified as non-SOEs by about ten percentage points).
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quarter of 2009.153 Between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first
quarter of 2010, the actual investment growth rate of SOEs stayed at
approximately 20 percentage points above its pre-stimulus average rate
for several quarters.
Investment, from both LGFVs and traditional SOEs, has played a
key role in reinvigorating China’s economy after the shock of the
financial crisis. Indeed, investment alone was responsible for
approximately 90% of China’s GDP growth in 2009.154 Unfortunately,
such a government-directed, SOE-implemented, and credit-driven
growth pattern is not sustainable, given the inefficiency of these
investment projects.155 Actually, the current growth model, which relies
heavily on investment to push economic growth, is the model that the
Chinese government has committed to reform for a decade.156 Compared
to the situation in 2007, when China’s former Premier Wen Jiabao first
openly admitted that China’s economic growth is “unstable, unbalanced,
uncoordinated, and unsustainable,”157 the only difference is that China’s
economic condition is now much worse, in view of its declining, or even
negative, TFP,158 which is believed to be the only factor that may sustain
an economy’s long-term growth.
153. Yi Wen & Jing Wu, Withstanding Great Recession like China 1, 18 (Fed. Res. Bank St.
Louis, Working Paper No. 2014-007A, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2407164.
154. Deng et al., supra note 93, at 55-56; Wen & Wu, supra note 153, at 15.
155. Cong et al., supra note 148, at 4-5 (finding that firms with lower initial marginal product
of capital, i.e., low productivity, experienced a relatively larger increase in borrowing and capital
investment than firms with higher initial marginal product of capital during the stimulus years).
They, therefore, conclude that there is an increase in the misallocation of physical capital during
the stimulus years. Id. at 4. Johansson and Feng examine the performance of both SOEs and private
firms after the introduction of the stimulus program and argue that “the overall effect of the directed
allocation of capital into the state sector that characterized the 2008 stimulus program has an overall
negative effect on productivity in the economy.” Johansson & Feng, supra note 113, at 1653. Bai
et al., supra note 137, at 162, similarly claim that, “in sum, the long-run effect of China’s temporary
fiscal stimulus program appears to have been an increase in the investment rate, a decline in the
current account surplus, and a decline in productivity driven by the increased misallocation of
resources.”
156. See generally Guangdong Xu, The Institutional Foundations of China’s Unbalanced
Economy, 67 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 1351 (2015) (discussing China’s current investment-driven
growth model and factors influencing it).
157. Premier: China Confident in Maintaining Economic Growth, CHINA.ORG.CN (Mar. 16,
2007), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2007lh/203252.htm.
158. E.g., Pingyao Lai, Growth Slowdown in China Since 2008: Will There Be a Hard Landing
in the Near Future?, 23 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 42, 43 (2015) (showing that, during the entire
period of 2008-2013, the annual average growth rate of TFP decreased by approximately 3.2
percentage points compared to the period of 2003-2007, and, for the years 2012 and 2013, the
annual growth rate of TFP declined to negative levels). See also Wojciech Maliszewski & Longmei
Zhang, China’s Growth: Can Goldilocks Outgrow Bears? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. WP/15/113, 2015) https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/
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In addition, as a result of China’s stimulus program, total industrial
production in China nearly doubled between 2007 and 2013, “making
China the world’s largest manufacturing giant and ending the U.S.
dominance it enjoyed for a century.”159 As a result of the rapid expansion
of production, capacity utilization in key sectors of the economy has
declined significantly from just under 80% before the 2008 financial
crisis to approximately 60% in 2011,160 which suggests that there is
substantial excess capacity in the economy.161 The overcapacity problem
is more serious in certain industries, such as iron, automobile, coal-to-

external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15113.ashx; Harry X. Wu, Sustainability of China’s Growth Model:
A Productivity Perspective, 24 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 42 (2016); Harry X. Wu, China’s
Institutional Impediments to Productivity Growth, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD 5 (Iris Day & John Simon eds., 2016) (on the
decline in China’s TFP growth after the stimulus program).
Narrowly speaking, TFP refers to the level of technology. In broad terms, however, TFP
is a variable that accounts for effects in total output that are not explained by inputs. See Barry P.
Bosworth & Susan M. Collins, The Empirics of Growth: An Update, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 113, 115 (2003). The authors differentiate TFP from technological processes by
stating that TFP “provides a measure of gains in economic efficiency (the quantity of output that
can be produced with a given quantity of inputs), which can be thought of as shifts in the production
function. But such shifts reflect myriad determinants, in addition to technological innovation, that
influence growth but that the measured increases in factor inputs do not account for. Examples
include the implications of sustained political turmoil, external shocks, changes in government
policies, institutional changes, and measurement error. Therefore, this residual should not be taken
as an indicator of technical change.”
Other indicators, such as incremental capital-output ratio (“ICOR”) and credit intensity,
show a similar pessimistic picture. ICOR refers to the number of additional units of capital input
needed for producing one unit of additional GDP. See Huang & Wang, supra note 88, at 195
(reporting that the ICOR rose from 3.5 in 2007 to 5.9 in 2015). Credit intensity similarly measures
the amount of credit needed for an additional unit of output; Longmei Zhang, Rebalancing in
China-Progress and Prospects 1, 3, 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/16/183, 2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16183.pdf (showing that the post-stimulus
average of credit intensity (2009-2015) had doubled compared to the pre-stimulus average (19932008)). In other words, with the declining economic efficiency, China needs more and more inputs
(particularly capital) to produce the same level of outputs.
159. Wen & Wu, supra note 153, at 17.
160. HUIHUA NIE, TING JIANG, YUXIAO ZHANG & MINGYUE FANG, CHINA’S ZOMBIE FIRMS:
CAUSE, CONSEQUENCE, AND CURE (2018). The authors argue that the most beneficial scope for
capacity utilization is between 79% and 83%. A report issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit
suggests that a threshold of 75% indicates a balanced relationship between supply and demand.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA’S SUPPLY-SIDE STRUCTURAL REFORMS: PROGRESS AND
OUTLOOK 1, 5 (2017), https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=ChinaSSSR
2017.
161. INT’L MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/195, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2012 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, 24-25 (2012) [hereinafter IMF,
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/195].
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gas, and cement,162 with the capacity utilization of less than 67%, 50%,
less than 50%, and 60%, respectively, in 2011. The ratio of so-called
“zombie firms” has, therefore, increased significantly, 163 leading to
serious solvency problems in certain industries and exposing Chinese
banks to increasing risk of Non-Performing Loans (“NPLs”).164
B. Financing the Increased Investment
1. Increased Bank Loans
Bank loans played a dominant role in financing LGFVs and other
SOEs before 2012. Bai, Hsieh, and Song report that 90% of local
governments’ off-balance-sheet spending, through LGFVs, in 2009 was
funded by bank loans.165 Similarly, Zhang and Barnett show that bank
loans accounted for approximately 80% of total local government debt
by 2010, equivalent to CNY 12.7 trillion.166 New bank credit to the real
economy during the stimulus years actually far exceeds borrowing by
LFGVs. Chen, He, and Liu report that, in 2009 alone, abnormal new bank
loans to the real economy were around CNY 4.7 trillion,167 among which
LGFVs received around 1.8 trillion, the non-residential non-LGFV sector
162. Other industries, such as household appliances, machine tools, and tobacco, are also
shown to be troubled by the overcapacity problem. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra
note 160, at 9.
163. NIE ET AL., supra note 160, report that around 7.51% of China’s industrial firms are
“zombie firms” during the period of 2005-2013. The ratio is much higher for certain industries,
such as iron (51.43%) and real estate (44.53%).
164. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 160, at 9 (reporting that it would take
ninety-five years and seventy-four years, respectively, for the coal and ferrous-metal (including
steel) smelting industries to pay back total debts); see also IMF, COUNTRY REPORT NO. 16/270,
supra note 123, at 9 (reporting that there is approximately 14% of Chinese firms whose profits are
less than interest payments). The official figure for the NPL ratio was 1.75% in June 2016. Huang
& Wang, supra note 88, at 196. Nevertheless, there is widespread suspicion that the official NPL
ratio significantly underestimates the situation. Id. According to Eswar S. Prasad, the actual ratio
of NPLs may range from 6-7% to as much as 20%, with an even higher ratio of around 25% for
certain smaller banks. China’s 13th Five-Year Plan: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec.
Review Comm’n, 114th Cong. 54 (2016) [hereinafter China’s Five-Year Plan Hearing] (statement
of Eswar S. Prasad, Tolani Senior Professor of Trade Policy, Cornell University). The IMF
estimates that potential losses on bank loans to the corporate sector could amount to 7% of China’s
GDP. IMF, COUNTRY REPORT NO. 16/270, supra note 123, at 9.
165. Bai et al., supra note 137, at 148.
166. Yuanyan Sophia Zhang & Steven Barnett, Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Risks from Local
Government Finance in China (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/4, 2014), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1404.pdf.
167. Chen et al., supra note 128, at 10. The total abnormal new bank loan is calculated as the
difference between the actual 2009 new bank loan (CNY 9.6 trillion) and the estimated 2009 normal
new bank loan (CNY 4.9 trillion, which is based on the average ratio of new bank loans over GDP
in 2004 to 2008). Id. at 51.
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received 1.5 trillion, and the residential sector received 1.4 trillion. The
aggressive credit growth in China increased the ratio of new bank loans
to GDP from approximately 15% in normal years to 27.5% in 2009 and
19.2% in 2010.
Both the Big Four and joint-stock banks reacted enthusiastically to
the stimulus program. The Big Four’s total loan balance increased by
17.49% (CNY 2.31 trillion) in the first quarter of 2009 compared with the
end of 2008, substantially more than the total increase of CNY 1.8 trillion
over the entire year of 2008; over the full year of 2009, the growth rate
of their total loan balance reached a historic high of 31.03% (or CNY 4.1
trillion), almost twice as much as the growing rate in 2008 (15.78% or
CNY 1.8 trillion).168 China’s joint-stock banks likewise increased their
loans outstanding by 19.76% (or CNY 1.18 trillion) in the first quarter of
2009 and 37.39% (CNY 2.23 trillion) over that entire year compared with
the loan balance at the end of 2008.169
It is not surprising to find that Chinese banks comply with the will
of the party-state wholeheartedly, given that the careers of their CEOs are
outright dependent on how well they serve the needs of the party-state. In
Deng et al.’s succinct words, “Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend,
and they lent.”170 There is a case vividly showing how the career future
of Chinese bankers will be determined by their response to the policy
signal of the party-state.171 Mr. Gang Xiao, the governor of the BOC in
2009, asked the BOC to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward credit
extension, and he was promoted to be the president of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) in 2013. By contrast, Mr.
Jianqing Jiang, the governor of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (“ICBC”), was reluctant to support the stimulus program, and he
did not receive any political promotion and finally retired and became a
professor.
2. Public Bonds
Witnessing the wild surge of bank credit in 2009, the Chinese
government realized that the policy-driven credit boom could grow out
of control and finally hurt China’s economy and, therefore, began to
tighten monetary policy and discourage bank lending to LGFVs and
168. Deng et al., supra note 93, at 69.
169. Id. at 71.
170. Id. at 55.
171. Viral V. Acharya, Jun “QJ” Qian & Zhishu Yang, In The Shadow of Banks: Wealth
Management Products and Issuing Banks’ Risk in China (Working Paper, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/ShadowBank-ChinaAQY-20161111_all.pdf.
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certain industries.172 The proportion of local government debt that is
financed by bank loans, therefore, dropped from approximately 80% in
2010 to below 60% in 2013.173 As a result of this policy change, LGFVs
and other firms are forced to turn to other financing vehicles, such as
chengtouzhai (which literally means Urban Investment Bonds,
(“UIBs”)), and perhaps more importantly, a shadow banking system.
UIBs are public bonds issued by LGFVs and can be regarded as
quasi-municipal bonds.174 During 2002 and 2013, 1,807 UIBs (with a
value of CNY 2291.59 billion) were issued by Chinese local
governments; moreover, the bond issuance after 2009 has become much
more aggressive, reaching a peak in 2012,175 701 issuances, with a value
of CNY 829.84 billion.176 While the development of UIBs may be
considered beneficial in view of its contribution to the regularization and
institutionalization of debt issuance by local governments as well as the
prosperity of China’s bond market, its dark side, such as its repaymentdriven purpose and its intertwining with China’s shadow banking
system,177 is disquieting.178

172. See Shalendra D. Sharma, Shadow Banking, Chinese Style, 34 ECON. AFF. 340, 345 (2014)
(certain government regulations, rules, and documents on this objective); see also DOUGLAS
ELLIOTT, ARTHUR KROEBER & YU QIAO, BROOKINGS INST., SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA: A
PRIMER 5 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/shadow_banking_
china_elliott_kroeber_yu.pdf. (certain government regulations, rules, and documents on this
objective).
173. Chen et al., supra note 128, at 19.
174. Fenghua Pan, Fengmei Zhang, Shengjun Zhu & Dariusz Wójcik, Developing by
Borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional Competition, Land Finance and Local Debt Accumulation in
China, 54 URB. STUD. 897, 905 (2017) (clearly stating, “local governments provide hidden
guarantees. If there is a risk of defaulting, local governments will step in and offer assistance and
bailouts.”).
175. Further, from 2008 to 2014, the UIB market increased by 85% per annum. Andrew Ang,
Jennie Bai & Hao Zhou, The Great Wall of Debt: Real Estate, Political Risk, and Chinese Local
Government Credit Spreads, 1 (Geo. McDonough Sch. Business, Research Paper No. 2603022,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2603022. In 2014, the number of new
UIB issuance reached 1,704, with a total amount outstanding of CNY 4.95 trillion. Id.
176. Pan et al., supra note 174.
177. In 2009 and 2010, almost all UIB issuances were for investment. However, repaymentdriven UIB issuance has become more prevalent since 2011. In 2015, almost half of UIB issuances
were for repaying maturing bank loans. Chen et al., supra note 128, at 20.
178. At the end of 2014, 40% of UIBs were held by Wealth Management Products (“WMPs”),
which is considered as the most important form of shadow banking in China. This fraction rose to
approximately 50% in mid-2016. Id. at 36.
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3. Shadow Banking
China’s shadow banking system has developed at an astonishing
speed since 2008.179 For example, Du, Li, and Wang reported that the size
of China’s shadow banking system took fifth place in the world in 2012
and third in 2014;180 by the end of March in 2014, social financing from
shadow banking accounted for 35% of China’s GDP, and its growth rate
was nearly twice that of bank credit; finally, the value generated in the
shadow banking sector was approximately 35% of China’s GDP in 2014.
Similarly, Sharma estimated the total size of China’s shadow banking
activities to have been CNY 22.8 trillion or 44% of China’s GDP in
2012.181
China’s shadow banking system has been described as a “complex,
byzantine network of unregulated lenders.”182 At least ten techniques and
instruments have been identified to be used by those shadow banking
participants: loans and leases by trust companies, entrusted loans,
bankers’ acceptances, microfinance companies, financial leasing,
guarantees, pawn shops and various unofficial lenders, Trust Beneficiary
Rights (“TBRs”), Wealth Management Products (“WMPs”), and interbank market activities.183 Among these instruments, entrusted and trust
loans and WMPs are believed to be the most important component.184
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the details of these
shadow banking activities. Rather, we only outline three important
179. As cautioned by Elliott et al., a serious problem here is that, “there is no single agreed
definition.” ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 172, at 4. We prefer to use the definition of the PBOC, which
defines “China’s shadow banking [system] as credit intermediation involving entities and activities
outside the regular banking system” that serves to provide “liquidity and credit transformation” and
“which could potentially” be a source of “systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage.” Id. For more
detailed discussions on the definition of shadow banking, see id. and Sharma, supra note 172, at
341.
180. Julan Du, Chang Li & Yongqin Wang, A Comparative Study of Shadow Banking Activities
of Non-Financial Firms in Transition Economies, 46 CHINA ECON. REV. 35, 37 (2017).
181. Sharma, supra note 172, at 342. Estimates of the size and exposure of China’s shadow
banking sector vary considerably. Id. The estimates range from approximately CNY 5 trillion to 46
trillion, or roughly 8 to 80% of China’s GDP. For more detailed discussions, see Sharma, supra
note 172, at 342 and ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 172, at 2. A most recent estimate by the Moody’s
Investor Service is CNY 64.5 trillion, which is equivalent to 87% of China’s GDP in 2016. Leng
Cheng, Shadow Banking Assets Estimated to Rise 21%, SHANGAI DAILY (May 9, 2017),
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/business/finance/Shadow-banking-assets-estimated-to-rise-21/
shdaily.shtml.
182. Sharma, supra note 172, at 342.
183. ELLIOTT ET AL., supra note 172, at 1-2.
184. Acharya et al., supra note 171, at 6; Franklin Allen, Yiming Qian, Guoqian Tu & Frank
Yu, Entrusted Loans: A Close Look at China’s Shadow Banking System, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming
Mar. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621330; Chen et al., supra note
128, at 12.
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features of China’s shadow banking sector, which we believe to be
relevant to the understanding of China’s financial condition after 2008.
First, the prosperity of China’s shadow banking system is the direct result
of the stimulus program. In Sharma’s words,185 “the meteoric expansion
of shadow banking in China is one of the unintended consequences of the
policies Beijing introduced to combat the negative effects of the 2008
global financial crisis.”186 Liang similarly claims that “[t]he sudden
reduction in formal banking credit paved the way for the rise of channels
of shadow financing.”187 As the title of the paper of Chen, He, and Liu
argues,188 “stimulus loan wanes and shadow banking waxes.”189 Further
empirical evidence is offered by Acharya, Qian, and Yan, Chen, Ren, and
Zha.190 Second, the shadow banking system intertwines with the formal
banking sector to a dizzying extent. For example, Wang et al. argue that
“[b]anks take a leading role in shadow banking, in order to evade
regulatory controls over interest rate and loan volume.191 They issue offbalance-sheet wealth management products (“WMPs”) to depositors and
make trust loans to borrowers. Banks also serve as intermediaries for
large corporations, mainly SOEs, to issue entrust loans to mostly private
enterprises (“PEs”).” Indeed, approximately two-thirds of business flow
in the shadow banking sector is effectively comprised of “bank loans in
disguise.”192 Finally, the development of China’s shadow banking system
may sow the seeds of financial risk or even crisis in light of its operating
pattern, which has been described as “less stringent regulation, lower
safety margins, riskier business models, and opaque business

185. Sharma, supra note 172, at 344.
186. Id.
187. Yan Liang, Shadow Banking in China: Implications for Financial Stability and
Macroeconomic Rebalancing, 49 CHINESE ECON. 148, 151 (2016).
188. Chen et al., supra note 128.
189. Id.
190. Acharya et al., supra note 171; Kaiji Chen, Jue Ren & Tao Zha, What We Learn from
China’s Rising Shadow Banking: Exploring the Nexus of Monetary Tightening and Banks’ Role in
Entrusted Lending (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21890, 2016), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w21890.pdf.
191. Hao Wang, Honglin Wang, Lisheng Wang & Hao Zhou, Shadow Banking: China’s DualTrack Interest Rate Liberalization 1 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
192. ELLIOTT ET AL., supra note 172, at 9. See also MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, CHINA’S
CHOICE: CAPTURING THE $5 TRILLION PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY (2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/Employment%20and%20Gro
wth/Capturing%20Chinas%205%20trillion%20productivity%20opportunity/Chinas-choice-captu
ring-the-5-trillion-productivity-opportunity-Executive-summary.ashx (estimating that “through
intermediation and other links, banks are connected to about 60 percent of shadow-banking assets,
which could lead to additional losses of 1.6 trillion” for banks).
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methods.”193 A report issued by Stanford Bernstein Researchers estimates
that the exposure of China’s eight major banks to the shadow banking
sector would be CNY 15.8 trillion, which may be further translated into
a NPL rate of 15%.194
In summary, it seems that after facing the challenge of an economic
downturn in 2008 and thereafter, the Chinese government has once more
resorted to financial repression policies, particularly the allocation of
credit, without hesitation, and tended to use such policies in a more
unscrupulous way.195 China’s growth pattern has, therefore, become
much more credit-driven, SOE-favored, and investment-driven and,
hence, less productive, less efficient, more distorting, more volatile, and
riskier than before 2008. China’s economy has indeed been rescued from
the threat of economic recession with the help of financial repression, but
at the cost of the prospect of sustainable growth in the long term.
V. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION
The financial repression in China as we sketched it in Section III
and more particularly the recent evolutions after 2008 (sketched in
Section IV) obviously have economic consequences as well. We first
sketch some of the direct effects related to the repressed financial system,
(A); next, we indicate a few consequences of a rather macro-economic
nature, (B).
A. Direct Effects
In Section III, B, we indicated how regulatory tools are used to
repress the financial system. In particular, we pointed at the dominance
of the state in the banking sector, at credit misallocation and at interest
rate controls. Those mechanisms of financial repression have clear
consequences that we will review in turn.

193. DOUGLAS ELLIOT & YU QIAO, BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING SHADOW BANKING IN
CHINA 18 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Elliott-ShadowBanking-2.pdf.
194. ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 172, at 15.
195. It seems that it has become a habit for the Chinese government to resort to a stimulus
program when facing the pressure of economic downturn since 2008. At least two small-scale
stimulus packages have been recorded and discussed in the literature. See generally Helmut
Wagner, The Building Up of New Imbalances in China: The Dilemma with ‘Rebalancing’ (Munich
Personal Repec Archive, Working Paper No. 71494 2016), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/
71494/1/MPRA_paper_71494.pdf; Bin Zhang, China’s Economic Transition Syndrome, 23 CHINA
& WORLD ECON. 59 (2015).
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1. State Ownership in the Banking Sector
Above we already indicated that the state’s large involvement in
China’s banking sector has led to a lack of effective internal risk
management and control and to a relatively poor performance of the stateowned banks.196 There are, however, additional consequences related to
the inefficiency of the large state involvement in China’s banking sector.
One problem is that, historically, China’s state-owned banks accumulated
a vast number of Non-Performing Loans (“NPLs”), which drove the
banking sector to the verge of bankruptcy by the end of the 1990s.
According to Lardy, “China’s four major banks as a group have a
negative net worth and thus are insolvent.”197 Using official figures,
Allen, Qian, and Qian compare NPLs in China, the United States, and
other major Asian economies from 1998 to 2006.198 They report that,
measured as a fraction of GDP, China’s NPLs were the highest in the
group from 2000 to 2006, reaching levels as high as 20.0% to 22.5% of
GDP (in 2000 and 2001).199 Moreover, these numbers may substantially
underestimate the actual amount of NPLs within China’s banking system
due to their exclusion of bad loans that have been transferred from banks
to four state-owned asset management companies (“AMCs”) and the
problematic classification of NPLs in China.200 If these factors are
considered, the amount of NPLs (and as a percentage of GDP) may be
twice as large as the official figures reported.
Another consequence of the state’s significant involvement in
China’s banking sector is that tremendous fiscal and financial resources
have been consumed to save China’s banking system by recapitalizing
the state-owned banks and by reducing NPLs. According to Ma,201 by
early 2006, estimated payments toward China’s bank restructuring bill
(recapitalization plus writing off NPLs) had approached nearly CNY 4
trillion,202 or 22% of the revised 2005 GDP. Taxpayers, shareholders, and
196. See supra Section III.B.1.
197. Lardy, supra note 57, at 119.
198. Allen et al., supra note 7, at 76.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 75-77.
201. Guonan Ma, Who Pays China’s Bank Restructuring Bill?, 6 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 1, 22
(2007).
202. Id. This figure is obviously an underestimation because the most troubled one of the Big
Four, the ABC, had not been restructured when the study was conducted. The ABC concluded its
reform by listing on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange on
July 2010. The reorganization costs of the ABC were estimated to be approximately CNY 1.4
trillion. Wu Weijun (吴卫军), Suansuan Nonghang de Gaige Dazhang (算算农行的改革大账)
[Calculation of Reorganization Costs of ABC], FINANCE.IFENG.COM (July 19, 2010), http://finance.
ifeng.com/a/20100719/2422099_0.shtml.
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bank customers all funded the restructuring. The problem of NPLs
appears to have been mitigated, and China’s banking sector has thus been
strengthened since 2006, at least according to the officially reported
figure.203 However, this improvement should be primarily attributed to
aid from the government, such as the recapitalization of bad loans, the
transfer of bad loans from banks to asset management companies, and the
rapid expansion in bank lending as a response to recent economic
prosperity.
2. Misallocation of Credit
As far as the misallocation of credit, the second feature of financial
repression, is concerned, there are clear negative economic
consequences. Above we already indicated the private sector in China
largely disfavors allocating credit, whereas state-owned enterprises are
financially benefited. This obviously has had an important economic
consequence. Private enterprises did not have the same opportunities to
develop and invest as state-owned enterprises did. Moreover, private
enterprises had to look for other forms of finance as the banking sector
was often largely unavailable to them. As a result, internal and informal
finance, such as retained earnings,204 trade credit, and private loans, have
played a more important role in financing the growth of private firms. 205
203. For example, the CBRC reports that by the end of 2010, the outstanding balance of NPLs
in China’s banking sector stood at CNY 1.24 trillion, and the NPL ratio of all banking institutions
was found to be 2%, representing a decrease of 4.7 percentage points from the 2006 figure (7.1%).
See CHINA BANKING REG. COMM’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, http://zhuanti.cbrc.gov.cn/subject/
subject/nianbao2010/english/5.pdf. By the end of 2015, after a huge volume of credit had been
issued for several years, the outstanding balance of NPLs in China’s banking sector stood at only
CNY 1.96 trillion, and the NPL ratio of all banking institutions was reported to be 1.94%, even
lower than that in 2009 and 2010. See CBRC, supra note 57. However, the reliability of such
information is questioned by a recent report issued by OECD. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], 2017 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF CHINA 26 (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-china.htm.
204. See, e.g., Guariglia et al., supra note 117, at 90 (concluding that “Chinese [private] firms
manage to invest and grow despite the significant financial constraints that they face, because their
high productivity enables them to generate large amounts of internal funds, which they then use to
invest and grow.”) and Carlo Milana & Harry X. Wu, Growth, Institutions, and Entrepreneurial
Finance in China: A Survey, 21 STRATEGIC CHANGE 83 (2012) (arguing that families and friends
are the most important source of financing for establishing new firms in China; at subsequent stages
of growth of entrepreneurial firms, retained earnings account for the second most important source
of financing).
205. Certainly, there is still a proportion of private firms that can obtain credit from the banking
sector. However, evidence shows that the main reason why these private firms receive formal credit
is their political affinity with the Chinese party-state rather than their growth prospects. We will
return to this topic in Section VI. Unfortunately, the real effects may not be favorable, even for
these private firms that have access to formal finance. See, e.g., Zhiyuan Chen, Yong Li & Jie
Zhang, The Bank-Firm Relationship: Helping or Grabbing?, 42 INT’L REV’ ECON. & FIN. 385
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Allen, Qian, and Qian report that the most important source of financing
for the private sector is self-fundraising, which includes retained
earnings, capital raised from family and friends of the founders and
managers, and funds raised in the form of private equity and loans.206 This
category of funds amounted to almost 60% of all funds raised for the
private sector.207 Lu and Yao claim that there are several channels
through which financial resources can be transferred from the state sector
to the private sector,208 such as trade credit,209 the diversion of assets and
bank credits from the former to the latter, and even direct managerial
“tunneling.”210 Credit discrimination may also force private firms to seek
foreign investors; by establishing cross-border relationships with foreign
firms, private domestic firms can bypass the financial and legal obstacles
they face at home.211 Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) can thus be relied
upon to finance the growth of credit-disfavored private enterprises, a
claim that has been confirmed by empirical evidence offered by Héricourt
and Poncet,212 and also Poncet, Steingress, and Vandenbussche.213
As a consequence, a large informal lending market has emerged in
China to fill the gap left by the formal system in providing funding to the
private sector. Li estimates that the total volume of informal lending in
2003 ranged from CNY 740.5 billion ($91.42 billion) to CNY 816.4
(2016) (arguing that there is a detrimental effect of bank loans on private firms’ performance,
showing that the interest payment (as the proxy for bank loans) of private enterprises is negatively
related to the return on sales (“ROS”) and asset growth (whereas this linkage is significantly
positive for SOEs)).
206. Allen et al., supra note 7.
207. See Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Formal versus
Informal Finance: Evidence from China, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3049 (2010). Using the same
classification, the authors find that Chinese firms source 20% of their funds from banks and 80%
from self-fundraising.
208. See generally Susan Feng Lu & Yang Yao, The Effectiveness of Law, Financial
Development, and Economic Growth in an Economy of Financial Repression: Evidence from
China, 37 WORLD DEV. 763 (2009).
209. See Robert Cull, Lixin Colin Xu & Tian Zhu, Formal Finance and Trade Credit during
China’s Transition, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 173 (2009). The authors “find that poorly
performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans
via trade credit[,] which can therefore be considered a substitute for loans that these target firms
were unable to obtain from formal credit markets.” Id. at prologue.
210. Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000). The authors use the term “tunneling” to refer to “the
transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top
manager).”
211. YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE
REFORM ERA (2003).
212. See generally Jérôme Héricourt & Sandra Poncet, FDI and Credit Constraints: FirmLevel Evidence from China, 33 ECON. SYSTEMS 1 (2009).
213. Poncet et al., supra note 116, at 412, 419, 422.
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billion ($100.79 billion), which on average represents 28.07% of the total
scale of lending by formal financial institutions.214 A World Bank-PBOC
survey on informal finance estimated the annual scale of informal lending
to be CNY 950 billion ($118 billion), or 6.96% of the country’s GDP. 215
Whereas internal finance and informal lending can be expected to help
private entrepreneurs start their businesses, the continued development of
private firms will finally outgrow the support offered by these informal
financial mechanisms.216 “Without access to formal finance, private firms
will be inevitably trapped in an inefficient state of small, simple and
outmoded technologies, and short life span[.]”217
As we have sketched in Section IV, the problem of credit
misallocation has accumulated after the stimulus program of 2008. Stateowned Chinese banks have to comply with the demands of the party state
more strongly, and as a result, bank loans have poured into low-yielding
projects, credit misallocation has worsened, and a huge shadow banking
system has developed.
An important consequence of the credit boom and the subsequent
rise of the shadow banking sector after 2008 is that China’s debt
accumulation has reached a stunning level. Debt held by LGFVs is
214. JIANJUN LI (李建军等著), ZHONGGUO DIXIA JINGRONG GUIMO YU HONGGUAN JINGJI
YINKGXIANG YANJIU (中国地下金融规模与宏观经济影响研究), [RESEARCH ON THE SCALE OF
UNDERGROUND FINANCING AND ITS MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS] (2005) (China).
215. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 207, at 3059. See also KELLEE S.
TSAI, BACK-ALLEY BANKING: PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA 1497 (2002); Kellee S. Tsai,
Imperfect Substitute: The Local Political Economy of Informal Finance and Microfinance in Rural
China and India, 32 WORLD DEV. 1487 (2004); Allen et al., supra note 7, at 79; MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 90, at 65; NEE & OPPER, supra note 107, at 98. All on the
connection between informal lending and the development of the private sector in China.
216. See, e.g., Ayyagari et al., supra note 207, at 3051 (showing that Chinese firms that use
formal bank financing grow faster and experience higher profit reinvestment rates than those that
are financed from alternative channels). See also Julan Du, Yi Lu & Zhigang Tao, Bank Loans vs.
Trade Credit: Evidence from China, 20 ECON. TRANSITION 457, 459, 460-62, (2011) (finding that
bank loans have a positive and significant impact on Chinese manufacturing firms’ labor
productivity, return on assets (“ROA”), and reinvestment rate, whereas trade credit does not have
any significant impact on firms’ performance and growth). They, therefore, conclude that “informal
finance cannot fill the gap left by the formal finance.” Id. at 459.
However, the situation is different for microenterprises. See, e.g., Thorsten Beck, Liping Lu &
Rudai Yang, Finance and Growth for Microenterprises: Evidence from Rural China, 67 WORLD
DEV. 38, 38 (2015), (reporting that “use of informal finance, especially financing from friends and
family, is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with employees, but not of
self-employed.”). This study does “not find any significant relationship between the use of formal
finance and firm growth.” Id. But see Hans Degryse, Liping Lu & Steven Ongena, Informal or
Formal Financing? Evidence on the Co-funding of Chinese Firms, 27 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 31,
44 (2016) (reaching a more balanced conclusion, showing that formal finance is important for the
sale growth of both small firms and large firms, whereas informal finance matters only for small
firms).
217. Xu, supra note 9, at 32.
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reported to be 31% of China’s GDP in 2015.218 The augmented
government debt, including both the central government and local
governments,219 is estimated to be from 45% of China’s GDP in 2012 to
55% of China’s GDP in 2014.220 Total debt held by the non-financial
corporate sector doubled from 68% of China’s GDP in 2007 to 136% in
2015.221 Altogether, China’s total debt (including the debt of the financial
sector) has nearly quadrupled since 2007, rising from $7.4 trillion to
$28.2 trillion by the second quarter of 2014 (158% of GDP to 282%).222
This ratio is higher than the aggregate ratio for advanced economies
(279.2%) and far above the average of emerging markets—excluding
China (186.5%).223 China’s debt increase also contributes to the global
accumulation of debt. For example, Dawson, Etra, and Rosenblum report
that the increase in debt in China accounts “for roughly one-half of all
new credit created globally since 2005 [and t]he country’s share of total
global credit is nearly 25 percent by 2017,” “up from 5 percent ten years
ago.”224
3. Interest Rate Controls
Turning finally to the third aspect of regulatory financial repression,
interest rate controls, a few clear economic consequences can also be
indicated.
218. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 192. However, the magnitude estimated by
Bai et al., supra note 137, at 147, is much higher. They report that by the end of 2015, the debt held
by LGFVs is CNY 45 trillion, or 66% of China’s GDP. Id.
219. Jian Chang, Lingxiu Yang & Yiping Huang, How Big Is the Chinese Government Debt?,
6 CHINA ECON. J. 152, 160 (2013). However, the authors estimate that if the contingent liabilities,
such as the pension gap, liabilities of the Ministry of Railway, liabilities of policy banks, and the
writing-off of bad loans of state-owned banks, are all included, the ratio might go up to 70-100%
in 2012. Id. at 166. For a more detailed discussion on different estimates on China’s government
debt, see generally Zhang & Barnett, supra note 166.
220. Chang, Yang & Huang, supra note 219, at 160; MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DEBT
AND (NOT MUCH) DELEVERAGING (Feb. 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/
employment-and-growth/debt-and-not-much-deleveraging.
221. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 192, at 5.
222. Id.
223. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 160, at 15; INVESTMENT MGMT. DIV.,
GOLDMAN SACHS, WALLED IN: CHINA’S GREAT DILEMMA 22 (Jan. 2016), http://www.goldman
sachs.com/what-we-do/investment-management/private-wealth-management/intellectual-capital/
isg-china-insight-2016.pdf. (concluding that “China’s debt burden is very high relative to its low
GDP per capita and is an outlier relative to countries with similar GDP per capita levels . . .
Comparing the magnitude and pace of the increase in China’s debt-to-GDP ratio to those of other
countries, we see that China’s increase is among the highest in recent history.”).
224. DAWSON, JEFF, ETRA, ALEX, AND AARON ROSENBLUM (2017) “CHINA’S CONTINUING
CREDIT BOOM”, LIBERTY STREET ECONOMICS, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK.
Available at: http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/02/chinas-continuing-creditboom.html.
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The direct result of the central bank’s approach to setting nominal
interest rates “is that household interest earnings on average have been
far less than they would have been in a more liberalized financial
environment, where market forces play a major role in determining
interest rates.”225 Lardy reports that whereas from 1997 through 2003, the
real return on a one-year bank deposit was consistently positive and
averaged 3.0%, since the beginning of 2004, the real return on a one-year
deposit has been in negative territory for approximately half the time and
has averaged -0.5%.226 By contrast, the corporate sector benefits greatly
from such a monetary policy. There was a marked decline in real lending
rates after 2003. Whereas “[i]n 1997-2003[,] the real rate on a one-year
loan averaged 6.8 percent . . . But since the beginning of 2004[,] the real
interest rate on a one-year loan has averaged only 1.7 percent, thus
artificially lowering the cost of capital and “encouraging investment in
projects that have much lower returns[.]”227
The low cost of capital in China has made it an anomaly when
compared with other countries, developed or developing. For example,
“based on data for 30,000 firms across 53 economies,” Geng and N’Diaye
“show that the real cost of capital—defined as a weighted average of the
real cost of bank loans, bonds, and equity—faced by Chinese listed firms”
is below the global average.228 The authors further argue that when
compared with its high productivity, China’s capital appears to be
particularly cheap. “[A]n estimate of the marginal product of
reproducible capital (i.e., capital adjusted for land) shows China’s return
to capital is well above” its real loan rate, which makes China an outlier
in an international comparison.
4. Summary
To summarize, one can argue that China’s repressed financial
policies have severely undermined the prospect of the country’s
economic growth by misallocating financial resources and damaging
economic efficiency. On the micro level, certain studies report that
financial resources are allocated in a highly inefficient manner. For
example, Bailey, Huang and Yang report that firms with poor
performance, as measured by ROA, are more likely to receive bank loans,
and these loans appear intended to keep troubled firms afloat as their
225. LARDY, supra note 113, at 80.
226. Id. at 85.
227. Id. at 86.
228. Nan Geng & Papa N’Diaye, Determinants of Corporate Investment in China: Evidence
from Cross-Country Firm Level Data 10 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/12/80, 2012).
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subsequent long-run performance is typically poor.229 Tan, Huang, and
Woo report that there is a positive relationship between the concentration
of state-owned banks and the number of “zombie firms”230—the higher
the degree of concentration of state-owned banks in a Chinese province,
the more zombie firms in that area.231 It is, therefore, unsurprising to find
that financial repression in China has led to a serious NPLs problem in
the past and may generate similar troubles in the future again.
Inefficient loan decisions on the firm level are further translated into
significant losses in productivity, total factor productivity (“TFP”), 232 and
revenues on the aggregate level. For example, Bas and Causa find that
aligning financial policies in China to the average level observed in
OECD countries would bring labor productivity gains of 6.5 percent in
the manufacturing sector.233 Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu find that between
1985 and 2007, capital and labor misallocation lowered aggregate nonagricultural TFP by an average of 20%, with capital misallocation
accounting for more than half of the total loss.234 Wu reports a higher
estimation, showing that policy distortions in financial markets caused an
aggregate TFP loss of 19.2%.235 Song and Wu estimate the effect of
financial market distortions on aggregate revenue in China’s
manufacturing sector and find that the loss could be 40%.236
B. Macro-economic Effects
The regulation aimed at financial repression in China has not only
the adverse economic consequences at the micro-level, as we just
229. Warren Bailey, Wei Huang & Zhishu Yang, Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics:
Some Evidence on Inside Debt in a State-Controlled Banking System, 46 J. FIN’L & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1795, 1813 (2011).
230. They classify a firm as a zombie by combining two criteria: (1) whether the firm receives
subsidized credit and (2) whether the firm’s profits are smaller than the interest subsidy. Yuyan
Tan, Yiping Huang & Wing Thye Woo, Zombie Firms and the Crowding-Out of Private Investment
in China, 15 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 32, 33 (2016).
231. They further show that after the exit of zombie firms, annual output growth could be lifted
by 2.12%, capital growth would increase by 1.4%, growth of employment would rise by 0.84%,
and TFP growth could be lifted by 1.06%. See id.
232. See supra note 158 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion on TFP.
233. Maria Bas & Orsetta Causa, Trade and Product Market Policies in Upstream Sectors and
Productivity in Downstream Sectors: Firm-Level Evidence from China, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 843,
845 (2013).
234. Loren Brandt, Trevor Tombe & Xiaodong Zhu, Factor Market Distortions across Time,
Space, and Sectors in China, 16 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 39, 52 (2013).
235. Guiying (Laura) Wu, Capital Misallocation in China: Financial Frictions or Policy
Distortions? 130 J. DEV. ECON. 203, 214 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.014.
236. Zheng (Michael) Song & Guiying (Laura) Wu, A Structural Estimation on Capital Market
Distortions in Chinese Manufacturing 2 (Nanyang Tech. Univ., Econ. Growth Cent., Working
Paper No. 1306, 2013).
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indicated. At the macro-level, financial repression also leads to (1) a lack
of balance between investments and consumption, which (2) in the long
run, even endangers the sustainability of economic growth in China.
1. Economic Growth Based on Investment, not Consumption
On the macro level, financial repression also contributes to the
formation and maintenance of China’s unbalanced economic structure,
i.e., the imbalance between investment and consumption. Theoretically,
in all economies, output expansion is the sum of growth in consumption,
investment, and net exports of goods and services. A key feature of
China’s growth pattern is that expanding investment, rather than
increasing consumption, which is the most significant factor to GDP
growth in other major economies, has been a major and increasingly
important driver of its economic growth. Therefore, China can be
described as following an investment-driven growth pattern.
In the 1990s, China’s average investment rate was roughly in line
with the historical high levels seen in newly industrializing economies.
However, investment since 2003 has consistently exceeded 40% of GDP,
which is higher even than the highest levels seen by China’s East Asian
neighbors during their respective periods of high investment rates. Dollar
and Jones show that in terms of the average investment rate (ratio of
investment to GDP) from 2000–2010, China “outpaced all other countries
save two—Bhutan and Equatorial Guinea.”237 Similarly, Nabar and
N’Diaye show that the investment share of GDP in China was higher than
that in any industrial country or emerging market from 2006 to 2012.238
There is also evidence at both macro and micro levels showing that
China’s investment is excessive. For example, Lee, Syed, and Liu
conclude that “investment in China may currently be around 10 percent
of GDP higher than suggested by fundamentals[.]”239 Using data on more
than 100,000 Chinese firms during the 2000 to 2007 period, Ding,
Knight, and Zhang calculate investment efficiency measures and find
evidence of overinvestment by firms that either invested much more than
industry median or more than optimal investment.240 In general, as Prasad
237. David Dollar & Benjamin F. Jones, China: An Institutional View of an Unusual
Macroeconomy 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19662, 2013).
238. Malhar Nabar & Papa N’Diaye, Enhancing China’s Medium-Term Growth Prospects:
The Path to a High-Income Economy 1, 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/204,
2013).
239. Il Houng Lee, Murtaza Syed & Xueyan Liu, Is China Over-Investing and Does it Matter?
1, 12 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/277, 2012).
240. Sai Ding, John Knight & Xiao Zhang, Does China Overinvest? Evidence from a Panel of
Chinese Firms, EUR. J. FIN. 1 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2016.1211546.
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concludes, “investment has been a major contributor to growth during
this decade[.]”241
As a result of interest rate controls, household interest earnings have
on average been “less than [they] would have been in a system with
market-determined interest rates.”242 Reduced interest income may
contribute to the decline in consumption through two channels. First,
decreased interest income means that there is less household disposable
income, which leads to lower consumption expenditures. Second, as the
real return on savings declines, households may save more (or consume
less) of their current income to achieve target saving levels. The
consequence of interest rate controls is substantial. According to the
estimate by Lardy,243 if deposit rate controls were eliminated, the share
of private consumption in GDP would increase by as much as 5
percentage points. That alone would reverse approximately two-fifths of
the long-term decline in the share of household consumption in China’s
GDP.
By contrast, enterprises—particularly SOEs—may be the major
beneficiaries of interest rate controls. For example, Ma and Yi find that
net interest payments as a share of GDP by the non-financial corporate
sector dropped by 50% between 1992 and 2007.244 “The low cost of
financing has led to a significant increase in the profitability of
enterprises since the early 1990s.”245 “The ratio of profits to industrial

241. Prasad, supra note 87, at 106; See Xu, supra note 156 for a more detailed discussion on
this issue.
242. LARDY, supra note 113, at 86.
243. Id. at 88.
244. Guonan Ma & Wang Yi, China’s High Saving Rate: Myth and Reality, 122 INT’L ECON.
5, 15 (2010).
245. Xu & Gui, An Empirical Examination, supra note 11, at 105. A series of studies conducted
by Yiping Huang and his colleagues provides crude estimates of the implicit subsidy (in the form
of the artificially low cost of capital) received by the Chinese enterprise sector via financial
repression. See, e.g., Yiping Huang, China’s Great Ascendancy and Structural Risks:
Consequences of Asymmetric Market Liberalization, 24 ASIAN-PAC. ECON. LITERATURE 65, 78
(2010). Huang shows that the subsidy amounted to CNY 607 billion, or 2% of GDP, in 2008. This
conclusion is further confirmed by Yiping Huang & Kunyu Tao, Factor Market Distortion and the
Current Account Surplus in China, 9 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 1, 26 (2010). They extend the period
to include the nine years from 2000 to 2008 and show that distortions vary from year to year; they
also report that the highest subsidy caused by capital distortion occurred in 2000 (equivalent to
4.1% of GDP).
In particular, SOEs benefit disproportionately from such financial repression policies. E.g.,
Giovanni Ferri & Li-Gang Liu, Honor Thy Creditors Beforan Thy Shareholders: Are the Profits of
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Real?, 9 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 50, 67 (2010) (showing “that the
costs of financing for SOEs are significantly lower than for other companies[,]” especially private
enterprises; if SOEs were made to pay the same interest rates as private enterprises, their existing
profits would be entirely wiped out).
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value added rose from an average rate of 22.6 percent over 1995-1999
period to 34.4 percent in 2008. The share of enterprise income in the GDP
rose from 14.2 percent in the second half of the 1990s to 22.9 percent in
2008.”246 The lack of attractive financial investments implies that firms
will either choose to spend their retained earnings on investment projects
to expand capacity or put them in a low-yielding bank deposit. Thus, the
implication of the distorted interest rate structure is that firms face a very
low hurdle when deciding whether to pursue a given investment project.
In summary, restricted bank lending rates and retained earnings have kept
the cost of investment funds very low and, thus, have encouraged
enterprises in China to invest excessively. 247
2. Investment-based Growth Inherently Unsustainable
An investment-driven growth pattern is inherently unsustainable.
The Solow model248 shows that without technological progress, an
economy has a limited ability to raise output per capita by means of
capital accumulation. Following the principle of diminishing returns, the
impact of capital accumulation on GDP growth will continually decline.
China’s investment efficiency has deteriorated over the past two decades
in view of an increasing incremental capital-output ratio, which means
that a greater share of GDP must be invested to maintain a fixed economic
growth rate.249 In fact, as Kuijs and Wang demonstrate,250 if China’s
current economic growth pattern continues, it will require an investmentto-GDP ratio of an unprecedented level of 55% on average between 2014
and 2024 to maintain GDP growth at 8% per year. It is impossible to
246. Dennis Tao Yang, Aggregate Savings and External Imbalances in China, 26 J. ECON.
PERSP. 125, 134 (2012).
247. Xu, supra note 9, at 39. The connection between financial repression and investment has
been empirically examined by Xu & Gui, The Case of China, supra note 11, at 393. The authors
find that a decrease in the real interest rate will stimulate investment. Id. at 401. This is consistent
with the argument that the lower the cost of capital (real interest rate), the stronger the firms’
incentive to undertake capital accumulation (investment). Id. at 392. In addition, more credit
extended to SOEs is also associated with a higher investment level, which may be attributed to the
stronger tendency of SOEs to invest as they usually face “soft budget constraints.” Id. at 401.
248. The Solow model is a standard neoclassical model of economic growth. Developed by
Robert Solow, it attempts to explain long-run economic growth by looking at capital accumulation,
labor, or population growth and increases in productivity, commonly referred to as technological
progress. According to the Solow model, without technological progress, an economy will end up
at a steady state that represents the long-run equilibrium. In the steady state, unfortunately, there is
no per capita growth.
249. Steven Barnett & Ray Brooks, What’s Driving Investment in China? 6 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/06/265, 2006).
250. Louis Kuijs & Tao Wang, China’s Pattern of Growth: Moving to Sustainability and
Reducing Inequality, 14 China & World Econ. 1, 11 (2006).
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finance such a high level of investment in the long run; thus, under these
circumstances, the investment-driven economy will ultimately reach a
dead end.
After the adoption of the stimulus program of 2008, the Chinese
economy became even more investment-driven, as numerous financial
resources have been poured into low-yielding investment projects. The
combination of rapid growth in credit and worsening performance on the
asset side of the economy has generated numerous worries regarding
China’s financial stability and economic growth prospects. For example,
based on the so-called credit-to-GDP gap, which is defined by the Bank
for International Settlements (“BIS”) as the difference between the creditto-GDP ratio and its long-run trend and is usually used to predict the
probability of a financial crisis,251 the IMF has warned several times that
China’s financial stability may face a serious threat in the near future.252
A similar pessimistic perspective,253 toward China’s financial security, is

251. See Credit-to-GDP Gaps, BIS.ORG, http://www.bis.org/statistics/c_gaps.htm (last visited
May 30, 2017).
Previous literature shows that a credit-to-GDP gap above 4% is a good predictor of financial
crisis. See Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe, Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises, BIS Q. REV., Dec.
2002, at 43; Claudio Borio & Mathias Drehmann, Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises-Revisited,
BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2009, at 29. But see Highlights of Global Financial Flows, BIS. Q. REV., Mar.
2017, at 21 (estimating the threshold to be 10% and argues that “in the past, two-thirds of banking
crises were preceded by credit-to-GDP gaps breaching this threshold during the three years before
the event.”).
This ratio for China was 20-25% by the end of 2015, which is comparable to countries that
experienced painful deleveraging, such as Spain, Thailand, or Japan. Wojciech Maliszewski et al.,
Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem 2 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/16/203, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16203.pdf. By the first
quarter of 2016, this ratio rose to 30.1% before it declined to 26.3% by the third quarter of 2016.
International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2016, at 1.
252. IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 15/234, (IMF, 2015. People’s Republic of China: Staff
Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report, No.15/234.) (warning that “the
high level of credit could weigh on China’s growth and financial stability. Cross-country evidence
suggests that episodes of similar credit booms often ended abruptly, accompanied by financial
crises or prolonged slowdowns in GDP growth.”). Therefore, “vulnerabilities have reached the
point that addressing them is an urgent priority.” Id. at 8, 30. The IMF further warns that, if there
is no serious reform in China’s financial system and the credit-to-GDP ratio continues to rise, there
will be an “increasing risk of a disruptive adjustment.” Id. at 10. A working paper issued by the
IMF also claims that “China’s credit expansion has been very fast by international comparisons.
Cross-country experience suggests that this increases the risk of disruptive adjustment, either a
banking crisis or sharply slower growth or both.” Maliszewski et al., supra note 251, at 1. Finally,
the IMF states that “China faces mounting risks to financial stability as credit continues to rise
rapidly.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT OF 2017: GETTING THE
POLICY MIX RIGHT (2017).
253. For certain optimistic perspectives, see, e.g., Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Economic
Reforms and Growth Prospects, 8 CHINA ECON. J. 95, (2015); Liang, supra note 187, at 143.
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also shared by Goldman Sachs,254 BIS,255 OECD (2017),256 and also the
Chinese authority itself.257
Financial repression therefore has significant implications for
China’s GDP growth. Several theoretical studies258 show that financial
repression has been harmful to China’s economic growth.259 For
example, Boyreau-Debray finds that the ratio of state-owned bank credit
to GDP has a negative impact on provincial economic growth and that
this negative impact is largely a consequence of the burden of supporting
the state-owned sector.260 Similarly, Guariglia and Poncet report that the
254. INVESTMENT MGMT DIV., GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 223 at 22 (concluding that
“comparing the magnitude and pace of the increase in China’s debt-to-GDP ratio to those of other
countries, we see that China’s increase is among the highest in recent history. Every major country
with a rapid increase in debt has experienced either a financial crisis or a prolonged slowdown in
GDP growth. History suggests that China will face the same fate.”).
255. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, China facing full-blown banking crisis, world’s top
financial watchdog warns, TELEGRAPH (Sep. 18, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/
2016/09/18/bis-flashes-red-alert-for-a-banking-crisis-in-china (stating that “the Bank for
International Settlements warned in its quarterly report that China’s ‘credit to GDP gap’ has reached
30.1, the highest to date and in a different league altogether from any other major country tracked
by the institution.”).
256. OECD, supra note 203, at 16 (warning that “the rapid accumulation of corporate debt
combined with a slowdown in economic activity and some of the practices of financial institutions
have significantly heightened systemic risks.”).
257. On May 9, 2016, an article was published in The People’s Daily, which is known as the
mouthpiece of the party-state. The article cited an “authoritative person” (believed to be Liu He,
the right-hand man of Chinese president Xi Jinping), who claimed that “it is neither possible nor
necessary to force economic growing by leveraging up” and warned that there might be a possibility
of systemic financial crisis if the process of leveraging up finally gets out of control. See Wen Gong
(龚雯), Zhifeng Xu (许志峰) & Qiuyu Wu (吴秋余), Kaiju Shouji Wen Dashi: Quanwei Renshi
Tan Dangqian Zhongguo Jingji (开局首季问大势权威人士谈当前中国经济) [Inquiring the
Trend at the First Year of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan: Authoritative Person on China’s Current
Economic Situation] (May 9, 2016) PEOPLE’S DAILY, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/201605/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20160509_6-01.htm (China).
258. For theoretical models on the connection between China’s financial distortion and
economic growth, see generally Zheng Song et al., Growing Like China, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 196
(2011), and Zheng Song et al., Growing (with Capital Controls) Like China, 62 IMF ECON. REV.
327 (2014).
259. However, certain studies find that the role of financial repression is more complicated.
See Yiping Huang & Xun Wang, Does Financial Repression Inhibit or Facilitate Economic
Growth? A Case Study of Chinese Reform Experience, 73 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 833
(2011) (show that the connection between financial repression and economic growth is changeable:
financial repression initially promoted economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s but has inhibited
economic growth over the past decade.); see also Xu & Gui, An Empirical Examination, supra note
11, at 1144 (demonstrating that China’s repressed financial system acts as a double-edged sword:
on the one hand, interest rate controls contribute to economic growth by lowering the cost of capital,
and exchange rate distortion promotes economic growth by stimulating exports; on the other hand,
credit misallocation and state ownership in the banking sector retards economic growth by
damaging economic efficiency).
260. Genevieve Boyreau-Debray, Financial Intermediation and Growth: Chinese Style (World
Bank, Working Paper No. 3027, 2003).
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indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in China’s finance
sector—such as the share of state-owned banks in total bank credit or the
ratio of total state-owned bank credit to GDP—are negatively associated
with GDP growth, physical capital accumulation, and productivity
growth, while indicators measuring the degree of market-driven
financing in the economy are positively associated with them.261
Therefore, one may argue that financial reform that intends to (gradually)
liberalize China’s financial sector and, hence, improve the allocation
efficiency of financial resources will contribute to China’s GDP growth.
Indeed, this is confirmed by empirical evidence. For example, Peng et al.
construct an index of financial liberalization to combine eight aspects of
China’s financial reform process between 1978 and 2004,262 and they
report significant positive effects of liberalization on growth in the shortrun and on accumulated growth in the long run. Similarly, Anzoategui,
Chivakul, and Maliszewski show that China’s GDP may be boosted by
approximately 4% by liberalizing interest rates and removing credit
discrimination.263
VI. A POLITICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The lessons from the economic analysis so far are clear: the Chinese
party state has used financial regulation as a tool of financial repression,
largely disfavoring the private sector—leading to a misallocation of
credit, controlling interest rates—leading to an artificially low cost of
capital, and a large intervention of the state in the banking sector—
leading to large inefficiencies in banking management. We equally
argued that in the long run financial repression has been harmful to the
economic growth of China, which has been confirmed by the various
economic studies we quoted, and that obviously leads to the question of
why the Chinese government is using these various mechanisms of
financial repression if they can ultimately harm economic growth. In this
section we will argue that the underdevelopment of the financial sector
cannot be fully understood without considering political factors, such as
the nature of a regime, social ideology, and the influence wielded by
261. Alessandra Guariglia & Sandra Poncet, Could Financial Distortions Be No Impediment
to Economic Growth after All? Evidence from China, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 633 (2008).
262. Jiangang Peng, Nicolaas Groenewold, Xiangmei Fan & Guanzheng Li, Financial System
Reform and Economic Growth in a Transition Economy: The Case of China, 1978-2004, 50
EMERGING MKT. FIN. & TRADE (SUPP. 2) 5 (2014).
263. Diego Anzoategui, Mali Chivakul & Wojciech Maliszewski, Financial Distortions in
China: A General Equilibrium Approach (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/15/274,
2015).
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interest groups. Politics may determine financial development directly by
influencing the direction of credit allocation and the access to equity
finance on the micro level and the performance of the financial sector on
the macro level,264 and indirectly by distorting the design and operation
of financial regulatory institutions.265 In one word, “political choices
deeply affect the development and operations of the financial system.”266
We therefore explore the relationship between politics and financial
repression in the Chinese context in this section.
In Part A, we explain the orientation on economic growth as a
strategy to improve the legitimacy of the Party. In Part B, we discuss how
financial repression also allows for a system of patronage through which
loyalty and support can be bought. In Part C, we explore the tools of
financial repression which equally allow a strategy of co-optation of the
Party with private entrepreneurs. Finally, in Part D, we discuss, to an
important extent, how the contents of the regulations aimed at financial
repression are also the result of struggles between different elites within
the party system.

264. See generally Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence
from Malaysia, 67 J. FIN. ECON. 351 (2003); Paola Sapienza, The Effects of Government Ownership
on Bank Lending, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 357 (2004); Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, Do Lenders Favor
Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, 120 Q. J. ECON.
1371, 1371 (2005); Michael D. Bordo & Peter L. Rousseau, Legal-Political Factors and the
Historical Evolution of the Finance-Growth Link, 10 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 412, 421 (2006);
Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing, and Corporate
Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (2006); Sourafel Girma & Anja
Shortland, The Political Economy of Financial Development, 60 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 567, 569
(2007); Stijn Claessens, Erik Feijen & Luc Laeven, Political Connections and Preferential Access
to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 554 (2008); Yongfu Huang,
Political Institutions and Financial Development: An Empirical Study, 38 WORLD DEV. 1667
(2010); Marc Quintyn & Genevieve Verdier, Mother, Can I Trust the Government? Sustained
Financial Deepening-A Political Institutions View 1, 1 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/10/210, 2010); Benhua Yang, Does Democracy Foster Financial Development? An Empirical
Analysis, 112 ECON. LETTERS 262, (2011); Nauro Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, Financial
Liberalization and Reversals: Political and Economic Determinants, 27 ECON. POL’Y 483, 488
(2012); Victor Menaldo & Daniel Yoo, Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin
America, 67 WORLD POL. 726, 727 (2015).
265. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and
Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1437, 1438 (1999). See
generally Barth et al., supra note 27; Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Political
Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century, 65 J.
FIN. 1029 (2010); JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD, JR. CAPRIO & ROSS LEVINE, GUARDIANS OF
FINANCE: MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US (2012); NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE &
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLITICAL BUBBLES: FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2013).
266. Stephen Haber & Enrico Perotti, The Political Economy of Financial Systems, (Tinbergen
Inst., Discussion Paper No. 045/2, 2008).
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A. Financial Repression within the Party’s Growth Orientation
It is hard to understand the emergence and continuation of financial
repression in China without considering the survival strategy of the Party,
particularly its “pro-growth” or “growth-oriented” strategy, which has
been adopted since the reform era began at the end of the 1970s.
Economic growth has been made a top priority in the Party’s agenda
because of the simple fact that the Party lacks legitimacy in the classic
democratic sense, and it therefore has instead been forced to seek
performance-based legitimacy by continuously improving the living
standards of Chinese citizens. For example, Perry concludes that “without
democratic institutions capable of conferring procedural legitimacy, the
ability of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to meet its pressing
policy challenges will depend to some degree upon continued economic
expansion capable of generating adequate employment opportunities and
financing critical redistributive and other government-led programs.”267
Perry’s view is shared by most of the scholars who study contemporary
China across disciplines and seems to be common sense. Chenggang Xu
even claims that “in the post-Mao era, China’s central leadership sees
economic growth as a life and death matter for the regime.”268 However,
there are dissidents who claim that in addition to economic growth, other
factors, such as ideology (Marxism, Maoism, nationalism, etc.), morality
of political elites, and other values and beliefs, are equally or even more
important in shaping the Party’s legitimacy.269 Certain recent empirical
studies also show that economic development is not a significant
predictor of regime support (and rising prosperity may even delegitimize
rather than legitimize the rule of the Party).270 Dickson finds that whereas
GDP per capita and GDP growth over the previous three years are not
correlated with trust and support towards the Party, 271 both the level of
267. Elizabeth Perry, Growing Pains: Challenges for a Rising China, 143 DAEDALUS 5, 8
(2014).
268. Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1088 (2011).
269. See generally Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China:
A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339, 340 (2009); Heike Holbig
& Bruce Gilley, Reclaiming Legitimacy in China, 38 POL. & POL’Y. 395, 396 (2010); Yanqi Tong,
Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy in China from Past to the Present,
16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 141 (2011); Yun-han Chu, Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate
over the Chinese Model, 13 CHINA REV. 1, 5 (2013).
270. Bruce J. Dickson, Public Goods and Public Support in China, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 2010
ANN. MEETING PAPER (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642972;
Chu, supra note 269, at 1.
271. BRUCE J. DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S
STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL (2016).
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family incomes and the increase in family incomes, which are the logical
consequences of economic growth, have statistically significant positive
impacts on regime support. The efforts of the Party to claim legitimacy
seem to be paying off: the majority of Chinese people show a certain
degree of support for the current political regime and do not favor a
fundamental regime change.272 China is, therefore, being classified as a
“high legitimacy” state.273
Economic growth may help to maintain the Party’s dominance not
only by improving its legitimacy, but also by strengthening its capacity
of repression, as well as by addressing certain challenges toward political
stability, such as unemployment. Repression has been identified as one
of the keys to the Party’s survival.274 With the help of economic growth,
China’s spending on public security rose 93% between 2008 and 2013.275
It was reported that China’s spending on internal public security (CNY
549 billion) overtook national defense (CNY 533.4 billion) in 2010.276
Economic growth is certainly the most effective tool that can be used to
address the unemployment problem.277 Workers, particularly those
migrant workers who can barely access China’s welfare system,278 have
272. Bruce Gilley, The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,
45 EURO. J. POL. RES. 499 (2006); Jie Chen & Bruce J. Dickson, Allies of the State: Democratic
Support and Regime Support among China’s Private Entrepreneurs, 196 CHINA Q. 780 (2008);
Yang Zhong & Yongguo Chen, Regime Support in Urban China, 53 ASIAN SURV. 369 (2013).
273. Gilley & Holbig, Reclaiming Legitimacy, supra note 269, at 398.
274. E.g., Minxin Pei, How China Is Ruled, 3 AM. INT. 44 (2008) [hereinafter Pei, How China
Is Ruled] (arguing that “the current Chinese political order rests on four pillars: an alliance among
political, social and economic elites; the control and use of economic patronage to distribute the
benefits of authoritarian rule among the elites; the application of selective repression against
potential organized opposition and mass unrest; and the adoption of tactical policy tools to respond
to public demands”); Minxin Pei, Is CCP Rule Fragile or Resilient?, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 27 (2012)
(similarly claiming that “the three keys to the CCP’s survival are refined repression, economic
statism, and political cooptation.”). See also DICKSON, supra note 271, at 31 (contending that
“repression has been a key part of the survival strategy of the CCP, as it is for all authoritarian
regimes.”).
275. DICKSON, supra note 271. See also Pei, How China Is Ruled, supra note 274, at 7 (stating
that “enormous resources have been invested in the manpower and technology required to maintain
effective surveillance groups and individuals suspected of anti-government inclinations.”)
276. See Beijing Raises Spending on Internal Security, FIN. TIMES, https://www.ft.com/
-content/f70936b0-4811-11e0-b323-00144feab49a (last visited June 15, 2017).
277. As the well-known Okun’s law shows, an increase in output growth corresponds to a
decline in the unemployment rate. See Arthur M. Okun, Potential GNP, Its Measurement and
Significance, in PROCEEDINGS BUS. & ECON. STAT. SECTION, AM. STAT. ASS’N 98, 103 (1962).
W. Raphael Lam, Xiaoguang Liu & Alfred Schipke, China’s Labor Market in the ‘New Normal,’
(IMF, Working Paper No. 151, 2015) (showing that this law also applies to China, as a one
percentage point increase in unemployment after 1993 is associated with a reduction in the growth
rate by approximately 0.8-1.0 percentage points).
278. Lam et al., supra note 277, at 3 (showing there were approximately 270 million migrant
workers in China in 2013, which was equivalent to approximately one-third of the total labor force
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to rely on their job-related incomes to support their (and their family
members’) lives. An economic recession that usually wipes out millions
or even tens of millions of jobs will place workers in a desperate situation,
and they will then become a threat to social stability.279 It is, therefore,
understandable that the Chinese government responded to the financial
crisis of 2008 with such speed and scale.
Whereas the empirical evidence regarding the connection between
financial repression and China’s economic growth is mixed,280 it is
logically understandable that the Party attempted to boost economic
growth by implementing a financial repression policy.281 The
contributing impact of financial repression on economic growth can be
illustrated by referring to the production function, Y = AF (K, L), where
Y is the output, K is capital, L is labor, and A is a productivity parameter.
Obviously, ceteris paribus, the lower the cost of capital, the stronger is
the incentive to undertake capital accumulation (investment, I = ΔK), and
the more capital accumulation is undertaken, the greater is the potential
for economic growth. Therefore, financial repression may arguably
promote economic growth by lowering the cost of capital (through, for
example, interest rate control), which therefore encourages investment
conducted by the corporate sector.
Indeed, certain previous studies found that financial repression
(measured by interest rate control, credit misallocation, dominance of
state-owned banks, and exchange rate manipulation) is generally
beneficial to China’s economic growth. Xu and Gui find that a decrease
in the real interest rate and an increase in credit extended to SOEs will
stimulate investment.282 Moreover, Xu and Gui report that despite the fact
that the effects of more credit extended to SOEs and a higher ratio of
assets of state-owned banks on economic growth are harmful, other
dimensions of financial repression, such as a low interest rate and

and half of urban employment). For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Xu, supra note
156, at 1359.
279. See, e.g., Ray Yep, Economic Downturn and Instability in China: Time for Political
Reform?, in BROOKINGS EAST ASIA COMMENTARY (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
economic-downturn-and-instability-in-china-time-for-political-reform/ (statements of Ray Yep)
(“[I]t is the migrant workers, who receive no systematic support in times of need, who are the most
at risk from the economic downturn”, and “the combination of presence of tens of millions of
frustrated, jobless, and landless people and the disposition of public security forces to sometimes
employ excessive violence toward complainants appears to be the perfect recipe for confrontation
and disturbance.”).
280. See our discussion infra Section V.B, particularly note 260.
281. Id.
282. Xu & Gui, An Empirical Examination, supra note 11, at 393.
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devaluation, help to promote economic growth.283 Xu and Gui therefore
conclude that “on the one hand, interest rate controls contribute to
economic growth by lowering the cost of capital, and exchange rate
distortion promotes economic growth by stimulating exports; on the other
hand, credit misallocation and state ownership in the banking sector
retards economic growth by damaging economic efficiency. The
apparent puzzle that a repressed financial system has not retarded
China’s economic growth can therefore be solved: when the pro-growth
effects of financial repression outweigh its anti-growth effects, the overall
influence of financial repression may be beneficial, rather than harmful,
to economic growth” (italics added).284
Certain other economies, particularly East Asian economies, have
reportedly followed a similar growth path during their development.285
For example, Wade reports that in Taiwan, the government used
concessional credit to lower the costs of production and thereby drive
investment, first in heavy and chemical industries, and, more recently, in
electronics and machinery.286 Cho shows that in Korea, government
intervention in the financial market was extensive in the 1960s and 1970s:
the government owned the banking institution, controlled its interest
rates, and directed a substantial portion of its loans.287 This strategy of
financial repression arguably helped Korea achieve fast industrialization.
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, therefore, argue that a modest financial
repression, or “financial restraint” in their terms, is beneficial to
economic growth.288
Such a growth pattern, however, has been shown to be unsustainable
in both theory and practice. Theoretically, as we have argued,289 there are
diminishing returns associated with the addition of any one factor of
production: without technological progress, the economy will finally end
up at a steady state in which there is no per capita growth. The East Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98, which brought growth in many countries to
an abrupt halt, can be cited as the strongest evidence for the unsustainable
283. Id. at 92.
284. Id.
285. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Guangdong Xu, Is China an Anomaly for
the ‘Law Matters’ Hypothesis?, 1 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 339, 343 (2014).
286. ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).
287. YOON JE CHO, Government Intervention, Rent Distribution, and Economic Development
in Korea, in THE ROLE OF GOV’T IN EAST ASIAN ECON. DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Masahiko Aoki, Hyung-Ki Kim & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara eds.,
1998).
288. Hellmann et al., Financial Restraint, supra note 31, at 48.
289. See infra Section V.B.
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nature of the East Asian “miracle.”290 Whether China can escape this
destiny is a question that can only be answered by time. But as long as
economic growth is still relied on by the Party as the basis for achieving
legitimacy, its control over financial resources, which is believed to
matter for economic growth, will hardly be expected to loosen.
B. Financial Repression and the Party’s Patronage System
Pursuing legitimacy through economic growth is certainly not the
only survival strategy of the Party. It also adopts other strategies, such as
establishing a patronage system through which loyalty and support can
be bought by material and non-material benefits, as well as co-opting new
social groups (such as private entrepreneurs) whose economic power and
social influence may become a threat to the dominance of the Party if
they are free from the Party’s control. Both strategies in turn demand an
economic system in which economic rents can be created continually,
distributed selectively, and protected effectively. Financial repression
policies are part of this story.
State-related institutions, particularly SOEs, are perhaps the most
important mechanism through which economic rents and loyalty can be
exchanged.291 In Pei’s words, “without its ability to hand out economic
rents, the Party would surely lose the loyalty of its supporters and its
ability to retain power. Thus, the Party keeps extensive and tight control
over China’s state-owned enterprises so that it can dole out political
patronage.”292 Similarly, Naughton shows that the Party has successfully
recreated a system of political patronage when the process of economic
reform and market transition took away the monopoly over the
distribution of patronage resources that political elites had enjoyed before
1978.293 SOE-related jobs and incomes constitute an important
component of this new system.
290. Nicholas Crafts, Implications of Financial Crisis for East Asian Trend Growth, 15
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 110, 110 (1999); Stephan Haggard, Governance and Growth: Lessons
from the Asian Economic Crisis, 13 ASIAN PACIFIC ECON. LITERATURE 30 (1999).
291. The role of SOEs in maintaining the communist regime is so important that they are
identified as belonging to the core of the Party-state complex of elite institutions. Barry Naughton,
Inside and Outside: The Modernized Hierarchy that Runs China, 44 J. COMP. ECON. 404, 410
(2016). See also Kellee S. Tsai & Barry Naughton, Introduction, in STATE CAPITALISM,
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION, AND THE CHINESE MIRACLE (Barry Naughton & Kellee S. Tsai eds.,
2015) (arguing that “state-owned firms have emerged as a crucial component of a revitalized
Communist Party system, and SOEs are looked on with renewed favor as one of the pillars of this
revitalized but still authoritarian and hierarchical system.”).
292. Pei, CCP Rule, supra note 274, at 33-34.
293. Barry Naughton, A Political Economy of China’s Economic Transition, in CHINA’S
GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 91, 91-136 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
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On the management level, CEOs of SOEs, particularly of SOEs
controlled by the central government (the so-called central SOEsCSOEs),294 are rewarded with high income and elite positions inside the
party-state for their loyalty and support. In terms of income, an article on
the Xinhua news agency website, the mouthpiece of the Chinese
government, claims that “statistics showed the average annual salary of
executives at centrally administered SOEs ranged from 650,000 to
700,000 yuan in 2010 and 2011. These salaries were significantly higher
than ordinary employees and those of government civil servants. In
addition to high salaries, many top executives at major SOEs carry a viceministerial or ministerial level ranking that brings them so-called
‘invisible income’ such as transportation and communication allowances
and other material benefits.”295 In terms of position, a number of positions
in several elite government and party bodies are reserved for leaders of
the CSOEs: twenty-two managers were nominated as representatives to
the Eleventh National People’s Congress and ninety-nine managers to the
Eleventh Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(“CPPCC”);296 more importantly, a significant number of leaders from
CSOEs are represented in important party platforms, such as the Central
Committee.297 For workers of SOEs, compared with their counterparts in
the private sector, their average wage level is much higher, CNY 23,565
versus CNY 14,096 in 2007, and the growth rate of their average wage is
also faster, 259.8 percent between 1992 and 2007 versus 178.2% between

294. These SOEs are supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC), an authority that was established by the State Council in 2003 to undertake
the government’s functions as investor and owner of state assets. The other SOEs are supervised
by local SASACs. For more details, see Xu & Gui, supra note 113, at 144.
295. China Orders Pay Cuts for SOEs Executives, NEWS.XINHUANET.COM, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/29/c_133606542.htm (accessed June 16, 2017).
296. According to the Chinese government, the CPPCC “is an organization of the patriotic
United Front of the Chinese people” and “conducts political consultations on major state policies
and important issues concerning the well-being of the people, and exercises democratic supervision
through proposals and criticisms.” See Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference:
Process of Founding and Key Achievements in History, CHINA.ORG, http://www.china.org.cn/
english/archiveen/27750.htm (last visited June 16, 2017).
However, the CPPCC and its local branches are commonly viewed as a “flower vase” or
rubber-stamp organization with no real power but to window dress. For a more detailed discussion
on the role of the CPPCC, see Minglu Chen, From Economic Elites to Political Elites: Private
Entrepreneurs in the People’s Political Consultative Conference, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 613
(2015); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV 697 (2013).
297. Kield Erik Bredsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in
Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624, 639 (2012).
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the same period.298 It is, therefore, not surprising to find that employees
in the state sector show more support for the party-state than their
counterparts in the private sector.299
In addition to distributing political and economic rewards, the Party
also exercises firm control over SOEs. More specifically, a SOE is
controlled by the Party-state through the following four mechanisms:300
(1) the fundamental discipline of the Party requires all Party members to
comply with the Party line;301 (2) the Party decides the appointment and
promotion of the top executives of SOEs;302 (3) Party cells within the
SOEs convene meetings to make important decisions for the company
and to ensure that the operation of the company is consistent with the
Party line;303 and (4) SOE executives accused of wrongdoing are
investigated by the Party and punished under Party discipline.304
Motivated by the economic and political benefits, and constrained by the
control and discipline from the Party, SOEs serve the interests of the
Party enthusiastically and effectively. For example, they are shown to

298. Sugin Ge & Dennis Tao Yang, Changes in China’s Wage Structure, 12 J. EUR. ECON.
ASS’N 300 (2014); As of 2010, it is also reported that 23 of China’s 31 provinces had governors or
vice governors who had worked as SOE executives. For these former executives, the new positions
“greatly extend their career ladders in the party-state hierarchy, bringing them more prestige and a
higher political status.” Jianyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s
State-Owned Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 660 (2014).
299. Jie Chen & Chunlong Lu, Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle
Class’s Attitude toward Democracy, 64 POL. RES. Q. 705, 715 (2011), (reporting that “there was a
significant, negative correlation between employment in the state apparatus and support for
democracy and democratization within the general population. In other words, those who were
employed by the state sector (government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public
organizations) were less likely to support democracy than those who worked outside of the state
sector.” Given the authoritarian nature of the current regime, rejection of democracy seems to imply
consent for the status quo.).
300. For more detailed discussions on the control of the Party, see BRUCE ARONSON AND
JOONGI KIM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 261 (2019); Pistor,
supra note 96; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 296.
301. All or most of the top executives and many other employees at SOEs are Party members.
302. The personnel of the CSOEs, ranked at either the ministerial level or vice-ministerial level
in the political system, is under the jurisdiction of the Party’s Central Organization Department.
The Central Organization Department directly appoints all of the top leaders of CSOEs, including
the chairman of the board of directors, chairman of the supervisory board, the general manager, and
other senior executives.
303. According to the Party’s notice, “the board of directors or general manager is required to
‘consult and respect the opinion of the Party organization’ before making any important decisions,
and brief the Party organization on the implementation of said decision.” Wang, supra note 298, at
656.
304. Id. at 652.
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help achieve social stability by maintaining employment and helping
rehabilitate the economy by conducting massive investment projects.305
Given the inherent inefficiency and heavy policy burden, such as
maintaining employment,306 it is hard for SOEs to survive without certain
governmental support, not to mention profiting. Indeed, China’s SOEs
were so inefficient that almost half were running losses in the 1990s.
Subsequent divestment and/or closure of thousands of small and mediumsize SOEs improved the situation, although 30% of the surviving SOEs
remained in the red in 2002.307 The situation has changed drastically
during the past decade, and the profitability of China’s SOEs has

305. Alexander Ljungqvist, Donghua Chen, Dequan Jiang, Haitian Lu & Mingming Zhou,
State Capitalism Vs. Private Enterprise 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20930,
2015) (showing that chairmen of state-owned enterprise groups “are rewarded for avoiding mass
layoffs: doing so significantly increases the chance of promotion . . . and reduces the risk of
demotion . . . .” As a result, capital allocations inside these groups are used to prop up their
members who are located in high-unemployment areas and provinces that experience unusually
large inflows of young men into the local labor market). Xianfeng Huang, Ping Li & Richard
Lotspeich, Economic Growth and Multi-tasking by State-owned Enterprises: An Analytic
Framework and Empirical Study Based on Chinese Provincial Data, 34 ECON. SYS. 160, 161
(2010) (reporting that SOEs contribute to economic growth by sustaining social stability (through
maintaining employment and offering material support for former employees)). For an early study
that builds models to explain the role of SOEs in maintaining social stability, see Chong-En Bai,
David D. Li, Zhigang Tao & Yijiang Wang, A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform, 28 J.
COMP. ECON. 716, 716-738 (2000). Deng et al., supra note 93, at 71, report that SOEs responded
to the Chinese government’s stimulus program “with prompt and substantial hikes in investment.”
Their growth rate in fixed asset investment was accelerated from 21.09% in the fourth quarter of
2008 to 38.50% in the first quarter of 2009 and 45.30% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Their
annualized growth rate in fixed asset investment then surpassed that of private enterprises by about
10 percentage points, whereas prior to 2008, they lagged private enterprises by about 10 percentage
points in terms of this indicator.
306. For a general discussion on the inefficiency of SOEs, see JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST
SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM (1992) and Andrei Shleifer, State versus
Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998). See also William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M.
Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 321, 48 (2001). After surveying the literature, the authors conclude that “[r]esearch
now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than
otherwise-comparable state-owned firms.”
In the Chinese context, see Martin Hovey & Tony Naughton, 31 A Survey of Enterprise
Reforms in China: The Way Forward, ECON. SYS. 138 (2007) (concluding that the “ownership
structure does significantly influence the performance and value of Chinese firms” and that “state
ownership is generally negatively correlated to performance.”). See also SHAHID YUSUF, KAORU
NABESHIMA & DWIGHT H. PERKINS, UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES 14 (2006). In a review of state-enterprise reform in China beginning in the
early 1980s, the authors posit that “[s]tudies extending back into the latter half of the 1980s . . .
have repeatedly shown that the efficiency and productivity of SOEs lag behind COEs [collectively
owned enterprise], TVEs [township and village enterprises], and joint ventures.”
307. YUSUF, NABESHIMA & PERKINS, supra note 306, at 14.
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increased impressively.308 However, an increasing amount of evidence
shows that the major driving force behind the profitability of China’s
SOEs consists of certain distorted economic policies that favor SOEs at
the expense of private enterprise development and the greater social
welfare.309 Financial repression policies are part of the explanation.
In 2011, the Unirule Institute of Economics, a Beijing-based
independent think tank, issued a report systematically examining the
subsidies enjoyed by SOEs during the 2001 to 2009 period.310 According
to this report, from 2001 to 2009, SOEs paid CNY 305.98 billion less, on
average, than what they should have paid out as interest rates annually. 311
In total, from 2001 to 2009, CNY 2,753.85 billion was not paid out as
interest rates but was instead appropriated by SOEs and included in their
nominal profits. Xu and Gui attempted to estimate the scale of subsidies
that flowed to SOEs from China’s banking sector, or more precisely, from
Chinese citizens through the banking sector. They found that subsidies
(rents) from financial repression are greater than the profits earned by
SOEs in most years from 1978 to 2012, if we assume that the real market

308. The reported average return on equity (“ROE”) of an SOE in China “jumped from only
2.2 percent in 1996 to 15.7 percent in 2007, before sliding back . . . to 10.9 percent in 2009[.]” THE
WORLD BANK & DEV. RES. CENT. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGH-INCOME SOCIETY 10405 (2013) [hereinafter CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGHINCOME SOCIETY]. From 2003 to 2011, the net profits of China’s SOEs increased from CNY 320
billion to CNY 1.9 trillion, based on average annual growth of 25.2%. China SOEs Report Surge
in Profits, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-10/24/
content_15843885.htm.
309. E.g., Xi Li, Xuewen Liu & Yong Wang, A Model of China’s State Capitalism 4 (Hong
Kong Univ. Sci. & Tech., Working Paper No. 12, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061521;
Julan Du & Yong Wang, Reforming SOEs under China’s State Capitalism, in Unfinished Reforms
in the Chinese Economy 30 (Jun Zhang ed., 2013) (arguing that Chinese SOEs have been highly
profitable over the past decade because they enjoy monopolies in upstream industries such as
energy, raw materials, banks, and telecommunications, whereas the downstream industries such as
manufacturing and other tradable sectors are largely liberalized. As a consequence, in this vertical
structure, upstream SOEs are able to accumulate profits by extracting monopoly rents from the
downstream private sector businesses).
310. TIANZE JINGJI YANJIUSUO(天则经济研究所) [UNIRULE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS], GUOYOU QIYE DE XINGZHI, BIAOXIAN, YU GAIGE (国有企业的性质、表现与改
革) [THE NATURE, PERFORMANCE, AND REFORM OF THE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES] (2011),
http://english.unirule.cloud/publication/2017-03-03/718.html.
311. In addition to lower interest rates, SOEs also received other subsidies, including unpaid
rents for nationally owned lands that were given to SOEs at no cost or very low prices, unpaid rents
for nationally owned natural resources (such as oil, natural gas and coal) that were extracted by
SOEs at very low prices, and direct governmental fiscal subsidies. From 2001 to 2009, the total
subsidies directed to SOEs were CNY 6,144.3 billion. If the benefits derived from governmental
policies favoring SOEs were deducted from their nominal profits, the real profits of Chinese SOEs
were in fact negative in five years from 2001 to 2009.
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interest rate is 10%.312 Even if we follow Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson,313
who argue that financial repression would most likely drive down interest
rates by two percentage points, and, therefore, use 2% as the interest rate
spread in most years, the financial repression rents remain more than 30%
of the profits earned by SOEs.314
C. Financial Repression and the Party’s Co-optation Strategy
The attitude of the Party towards entrepreneurs and their private
enterprises seems to be contradictory. On the one hand, as Haggard and
Huang argue,315 “despite the well-documented process of economic
reform in China, the domestic private sector remains relatively small and
subject to a variety of policy and economic constraints[,]”316 or as
McGregor states,317 entrepreneurs “were more like valued foster-children
than part of the family.”318 On the other hand, as argued by Dickson,319
when Leninist parties, such as the Communist Party of China, “abandon
class struggle for the sake of economic modernization, [they] typically
switch from an exclusionary to an inclusionary, or cooptive” strategy. In
the post-Mao period, intelligentsia, technocrats, and particularly private
entrepreneurs are brought into the party-state system because they have
the skills and resources desired by the Party to accomplish its new policy
agenda (economic growth, technological improvement, etc.). In addition,
it is safer for the Party to place these newly emerging classes under its
312. For a discussion on the reason for choosing 10% as the real market interest rate, see
Haibing Gu, Hongyan Shi & Wei Liu, Woguo Yinhang Daikuan Lilv De Jiegouxing Fenxi [A
Structural Analysis of the Banks’ Lending Rates in China], 3 XUESHU YANJIU [ACADEMIC
RESEARCH] 62 (2006) (China).
313. GERARD, JR. CAPRIO, IZAK ATIYAS & JAMES A. HANSON, FINANCIAL REFORM: THEORY
AND EXPERIENCE, 379 (1996).
314. Xu & Gui, supra note 113, at 154.
315. Haggard & Huang, supra note 108, at 338.
316. NEE & OPPER, supra note 107, at 5-7, report that “during the first decade of reform, though
the central government encouraged household businesses (geti hu), it explicitly sought to restrict
private commercial activities to a peripheral role . . . Through the decade of the 1990s, the central
government’s policy sought to contain the private enterprise economy as a peripheral, subordinate
sector of the Chinese economy . . . Although in 2004 the government amended the constitution to
confer to private firms equality with state-owned enterprises and formally guaranteed to ‘protect
the lawful rights and interests of the private sector’, private property remained vulnerable.” In
general, “the political logic of reform in China was aimed at safeguarding and protecting the public
ownership economy.” NEE & OPPER, supra note 107, at 8.
317. McGregor, supra note 96, at 228.
318. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that the Party might reason that
entrepreneurs endowed with economic power and wealth today will gain political power in the
future and therefore pose a threat to the supremacy of the Party. HUANG, supra note 211.
319. Bruce J. Dickson, Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,
115 POL. SCI. Q. 517, 519 (2001).
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direct oversight rather than leaving them to grow into certain independent
powers and finally become a threat to the dominance of the Party. 320
Private entrepreneurs can be incorporated into the party-state system
through several channels. The first is to recruit private entrepreneurs into
the Party who then become so-called “red capitalists.” For example,
Dickson reports that “in the late 1990s, approximately 20 percent of
entrepreneurs were Party members, and by 2004, that number had grown
to almost 35%.”321 This ratio has been shown to have remained between
30% and 35% between 2002 and 2012.322 In addition to recruiting private
entrepreneurs, the Party also extends its tentacles to the grass-roots level
of private enterprises by recruiting technicians and ordinary workers and
establishing Party branches in private enterprises. Sun reports that by
2009, there were 3.58 million Party members in private enterprises,323
with ordinary workers accounting for 46% and management staff and
technicians accounting for 54%.
320. E.g., Ling Chen & Barry Naughton, A Dynamic China Model: The Co-Evolution of
Economics and Politics in China, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 18, 21 (2017). The authors conclude that
inclusiveness is one of the pillars of the Party’s claim to legitimacy. More specifically, they argue
that “[w]hen a new social group emerges, the Party begins a political process to incorporate that
group into its governance structure. ‘Inclusiveness’ means that the Party has an obligation to listen
to and respond to the interests of new social groups, and also that it seeks to ensure that no social
group can have an independent power base to challenge the regime from the ‘outside,’” Id.
321. Bruce J. Dickson, Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party’s
Embrace of the Private Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 827, 837 (2007).
322. Xuan He & Jun Ma, Zhizhengdang Dui Siying Qiye De Tonghe Celve Jiqi Xiaoying Fenxi
[An Analysis on the CCP’s Co-opting Strategy towards Private Enterprises and Its Effects], 36
SHEHUI [SOCIETY] 175 (2016). It is worth noting that certain (or even most) private entrepreneurs
with Party membership actually joined the Party before they started their business; they used to be
affiliated with the party-state in one way or another, such as being an official or a manager in an
SOE. Peng Lv (吕鹏), Siying Qiyezhu Ren Renda Daibiao Huo Zhengxie Weiyuan De Yinsu Fenxi
(私营企业主任人大代表或政协委员的因素分析) [An Empirical Analysis on the Impact Factors
of Being Representatives in the People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference
for Private Entrepreneurs], 4 SHEHUIXUE YANJIU (社会学研究) [SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES] 154
(2013); Xiangpeng Jin (金祥鹏), Chushi Zhengzhi Ziben, Renli Ziben, yu Siying Qiyejia
Canzhengyizheng [Initial Political Capital: Human Capital, and Private Entrepreneurs’
Participation in Politics], 55 ZHONGSHANDAXUE XUEBAO SHEHUIKEXUEBAN (中山大
学学报社会科学版) J. SUN YAT-SEN U. SOC. SCI. EDITION, 152 (2015). These veteran Party
members seem to be more favored politically than their neophyte counterparts. For example, Lv,
supra note 322, reports that veteran Party members are more easily selected as delegates of the
People’s Congress at different levels. It is also worth noting that for those private entrepreneurs
who are not Party members, they can still reach the party-state through their relatives, friends,
classmates, etc., who are themselves Party members and/or officials. Christopher A. McNally &
Teresa Wright, Sources of Social Support for China’s Current Political Order: The ‘Thick
Embeddedness’ of Private Capital Holders, 43 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 189, 194
(2010).
323. Yingshuai Sun, Zhongguo Gongchandang Dangyuan Shuliang Yu Jiegou Bianhua Ji
Fazhan Qushi [The Change in Quantity and Structure of CCP Members and Their Trend], 5
BEIJING XINGZHENGXUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. BEIJING ADMINISTRATIVE COLLEGE] 28 (2009).
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The second channel is to elect private entrepreneurs to the People’s
Congress (“PC”) and the People’s Political Consultative Conference
(“PPCC”) at different levels. Dickson reports that by 2004, nationwide,
over 9,000 entrepreneurs had been elected to the PC and 30,000 to the
PPCC at the county level and above.324 Jin finds that 52% of private
entrepreneurs participate in China’s political process by acting as
delegates of the PC, the PPCC, or the Party’s congresses.325 Zhou
similarly reports that 37.47% of private entrepreneurs are either PC
delegates or PPCC delegates (with an additional 16.68% who are Party
members, but not delegates of the PC or the PPCC).326 Finally, private
entrepreneurs may join government-sponsored associations, such as the
Private Enterprises’ Association and the All-China Industrial and
Commercial Federation. A 2002 to 2004 study of rural private
entrepreneurs reports that more than 70% were members of at least one
government-sponsored association.327
Co-opted entrepreneurs are rewarded for their loyalty to and
cooperation with the party-state with certain economic benefits,328 such
as valuable financial resources.329 Numerous empirical studies confirm

324. Dickson, supra note 321, at 843.
325. Jin, supra note 322.
326. Lvjun Zhou, Fuhao Fenceng: Siying Qiyezhu De Zhengzhi Qianru Moshi Jiqi Diwei
Rentong Chayi [Symbolic Stratification: The Pattern of Private Entrepreneurs’ Political
Embeddedness and the Difference of Their Status Identification], 3 SHEHUI FAZHAN YANJIU
[CHINESE J. SOC. DEV.] 27 (2016).
327. McNally & Wright, supra note 322, at 192.
328. Political connections may not only bring material benefits to private entrepreneurs but
may also protect them from public enforcement of certain laws and regulations. See, e.g., Henk
Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder
Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1391 (2010) (discussing securities market regulation); Xin Sun, Selective Enforcement
of Land Regulations: Why Large-Scale Violators Succeed?, 74 CHINA J. 66 (2015) (discussing land
regulation); Wenfeng Wu, Chongfeng Wu, Chunyang Zhou & Jun Wu, Political Connections, Tax
Benefits and Firm Performance: Evidence from China, 31 J. ACC. & PUB. POL’Y 277 (2012)
(discussing tax benefits); Yang Song, Jidong Yang & Qijing Yang, Do Firms’ Political
Connections Depress the Union Wage Effect? Evidence from China, 38 CHINA ECON. REV. 183
(2016) (showing how political connections undermine the role of unions in increasing wages);
Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and the Use of
Courts among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318 (2014) (reporting that private enterprises
with political tie resort to court more frequently in dispute resolution).
In summary, McNally & Wright, supra note 322, at 196, conclude that, “for private
entrepreneurs, close ties to the party-state, such as strong personal guanxi or kinship ties with
power-brokers in the Party or membership in the Party and/or one of its affiliated organizations,
facilitate their ability to gain information, access credit, procure licenses, avoid onerous taxes and
obtain land.”
329. For those private entrepreneurs who lack such political connections, they may still access
bank credit by bribing bank officials. See, e.g., Yunling Chen, Ming Liu & Jun Su, Greasing the
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that political connections, particularly membership in the PC,330 help
private entrepreneurs access bank credit more easily and at a better price.
For example, Bai, Lu, and Tao find that “access to bank loans is
significantly easier for entrepreneurs who are members of the Chinese
People’s Congress, but membership of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference has a limited effect.”331 This conclusion is
further supported by subsequent studies, such as Zhou;332 Sun, Zhu, and
Wu;333 Yang, Lu, and Luo;334 Feng, Johansson, and Zhang;335 and Zhao
and Lu.336 In addition to bank loan accessibility, political connections are
also shown to affect private enterprises’ access to China’s stock
markets.337
With the help of certain economically distorting policies, such as the
financial repression policies through which the party-state can influence
the direction of financial resources, the Party’s co-optation strategy seems
to work considerably well. Co-opted entrepreneurs show strong support

Wheels of Bank Lending: Evidence from Private Firms in China, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 2533
(2013).
330. Studies use different proxies for political connections, such as Party membership of
entrepreneurs, government intervention in CEO appointments, and top managers (or board
members) as officials at certain levels, also confirm the importance of political connections in
helping private entrepreneurs address financial constraints. See, e.g., Hongbin Li, Lingsheng Meng,
Qian Wang & Li-An Zhou, Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence
from Chinese Private Firms, 87 J. DEV. ECON. 283 (2008); Di Guo, Kun Jiang, Byung-Yeon Kim
& Chenggang Xu, Political Economy of Private Firms in China, 42 J. COMP. ECON. 286 (2014);
Robert Cull, Wei Li, Bo Sun & Lixin Colin Xu, Government Connections and Financial
Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 271
(2015); Zhong-qin Su & Hung-Gay Fung, Political Connection and Firm Performance in Chinese
Companies, 18 PAC. ECON. REV. 283 (2013).
331. Bai et al., supra note 111, at 623.
332. Wubiao Zhou, Bank Financing in China’s Private Sector: The Payoffs of Political
Capital, 37 WORLD DEV. 787 (2009).
333. Xin Sun, Jiangnan Zhu & Yiping Wu, Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private
Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislature, 14 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 1 (2014).
334. Deming Yang, Zhengfei Lu & Danglun Luo, Political Connections, Media Monitoring
and Long-term Loans, 7 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 165 (2014).
335. Xunan Feng, Anders C. Johansson & Tianyu Zhang, Mixing Business with Politics:
Political Participation by Entrepreneurs in China, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 220 (2015).
336. Hongxin Zhao & Juangyong Lu, Contingent Value of Political Capital in Bank Loan
Acquisition: Evidence from Founder-controlled Private Enterprises in China, 31 J. BUS.
VENTURING 153 (2016).
337. See, e.g., Qigui Liu, Jonghua Tang & Gary Gang Tian, Does Political Capital Create
Value in the IPO Market? Evidence from China, J. CORP. FIN. 395 (2013); Guoping Li & Hong
Zhou, Political Connections and Access to IPO Markets in China, 33 CHINA ECON. REV. 76 (2015);
Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan & Xian Sun, Political Connections and the Process of Going Public:
Evidence from China, 28 J. INT’L. MONEY & FIN. 696 (2009) (finding that firms with political
connections reap other preferential benefits in the process of going public, such as a relatively
higher offering price, lower underpricing, and lower fixed costs during the going-public process).
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toward the status quo in which the Party enjoys monopolized political
power. For example, Chen and Dickson report that private entrepreneurs
with Party membership (including those who have applied to join the
Party, those who were formerly cadres, and those who were formerly
SOE managers) have significantly higher levels of regime support than
entrepreneurs who have no political affiliations with the party-state.338
Similarly, Dickson finds that private entrepreneurs, particularly co-opted
entrepreneurs, share similar viewpoints on a range of political, economic,
and social issues with communist officials.339 Dickson concludes that
“China’s private entrepreneurs and red capitalists in particular are not
only increasingly integrated into the political system, they have views
that are increasingly similar to those of local Party and government
officials, making them unlikely agents of political change.” 340 Dickson
and Ma also report that private entrepreneurs with Party membership
show a much higher evaluation on the Party’s policies than entrepreneurs
without such status.341
Co-opted entrepreneurs, however, may not be as reliable an ally as
expected by the Party. As cautioned by Pei, “[t]he long-term effectiveness
of political cooptation is also limited by the questionable loyalty of those
social elites being targeted for recruitment into the Party and its patronage
system. To the extent that these individuals join the Party or support its
policies chiefly out of pecuniary interests, the CPC may not be able to
count on their loyalty if its ability to satisfy their material interests
declines, due to poor economic performance or constraints on the state’s
fiscal capacity.”342 In other words, their support for the Party is contingent
upon the Party’s ability to provide favors and grant privileges. Even
worse, their close connections with the party-state in general and certain
officials in particular may breed corruption and rent-seeking behaviors,343
338. Chen & Dickson, supra note 272, at 780.
339. Dickson, supra note 321, at 852.
340. Id. at 847.
341. He & Ma, supra note 322 at 177-178.
342. Pei, CCP Rule, supra note 274, at 37.
343. See, e.g., Joseph P.H. Fan, Oliver Meng Rui & Mengxin Zhao, Public Governance and
Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 343 (2008) (finding “that
being connected with corrupt bureaucrats provides firms with a comparative advantage in obtaining
access to debt, and in particular long-term debt.”); Charles J.P. Chen, Zengquan Li, Xijia Su &
Zheng Sun, Rent-seeking Incentives, Corporate Political Connections, and the Control Structure
of Private Firms: Chinese Evidence, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 229 (2011) (reporting that private firms are
more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less marketoriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources (and
therefore opportunities for rent-seeking are rife); Xuesong Tang, Yan Lin, Qing Peng, Jun Du &
Kam C. Chan, Politically Connected Directors and Firm Value: Evidence from Forced
Resignations in China, 37 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 148 (2016) (showing “that the value of firms
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distort the level-playing field,344 trigger social discontent,345 and finally
endanger the Party’s rule.346
D. Financial Repression and Intra-Elite Struggles inside the Party-State
As a Leninist organization, the Party is supposed to maintain an
extremely high level of solidarity and unity with the help of severe
discipline, clear hierarchical structure, and, more importantly, the socalled principle of “democratic centralism.”347 This is far from the truth,
however. As numerous studies have shown, intra-elite struggles and
factional politics are prevalent in the entire history of the Party. 348 In
Nathan and Tsai’s words,349 “[f]or twenty-two years scholars have found
the factionalism model useful as a starting point for analy[z]ing how

with politically connected directors drops significantly” after their directors’ resignations. This
effect is more pronounced for firms in a regulated industry and for private firms).
344. See generally the literature discussed in footnote 329.
345. President Xi admitted that “corruption has played a big role in conflicts that grew over
lengthy periods, and it has led to popular discontent, social unrest and the overthrow of the political
power.” See Zachary Keck, China’s Corruption Problem: A Catch-22, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 19,
2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/chinas-corruption-problem-a-catch-22/.
346. Xie Yu, Poll: Corruption, Public Discontent Most Worrisome, CHINA DAILY (July 9,
2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/09/content_10084440. This article reports
that, in a survey conducted in 2010, more than half of the respondents said that “wide-spread
corruption and public discontent” were the major threats faced by the Chinese society. See Robert
Hamel & Yao-Yuan Yeh, Corruption and Government Satisfaction in Authoritarian Regimes: The
Case of China, 2011 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N ANN. MEETING PAPER, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899973. Using data from a 2008 nationwide survey in China, the authors
find that “whether asked about corruption generally or about local cadre corruption more
specifically” nearly two-thirds of respondents “considered corruption to be a ‘serious problem.’”
They further report, “that perceived corruption (whether general or location-specific) is
negatively—and significantly so—correlated with citizens’ satisfaction with all levels of
government.” See also DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 271 (showing that
attitudes about corruption are closely correlated with regime support: the more prevalent that people
think corruption is among central and local officials, the lower their regime support is).
347. The core of “democratic centralism”, as defined by the Party’s Constitution, is “individual
Party members are subordinate to the Party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority,
the lower Party organizations are subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the
constituent organizations and members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and
the Central Committee of the Party.” See Chapter 2, Article 10 of the Party’s Constitution, available
at http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188092.html (accessed 21 June 2017).
348. Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, 53 CHINA Q. 33 (1973); Tang
Tsou, Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics, 65 CHINA Q.98 (1976). For
more recent studies, see JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS (2000);
JOSEPH FEWSMITH, ELITE POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2001); ZHIYUE BO, CHINA’ ELITE
POLITICS: POLITICAL TRANSITION AND POWER BALANCING (2007). See also VICTOR SHIH,
FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA: ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008).
349. Andrew Nathan & Kellee S. Tsai, Factionalism: A New Institutional Restatement, 34
CHINA J. 157 (1995).
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Chinese elite politics work.” Similarly, Dittmer350 argues that
factionalism “constitutes a central, even modal, pattern of Chinese
political behaviour deeply rooted in cultural and psychological security
drives.”351
Shih, Shan, and Liu use a database that tracks the biographies of all
Central Committee members of the Party from 1921 to 2007, to show that
even Chairman Mao Zedong, the charismatic and all-powerful leader,
could not maintain a commanding presence within the Party elite after
the establishment of the People’s Republic.352 The best survival strategy
for the Party’s top leaders is, therefore, to try to “eliminate challengers
and to bolster their own faction through promotions and political
struggle.”353 Factional politics reached a new level after 1978, when
China began to gradually move away from rule by a single leader (such
as Chairman Mao) and toward a collective form of leadership.354 Recent
leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were, to a large extent, merely
“first among equals” in their respective generations of collective
leadership, and could hardly wield the sort of power enjoyed by Mao or
Deng Xiaoping.355 Rather, newer leaders have had to govern the Party
through coalition building and political compromise. As a result,
factional politics prevails in the political arena.356
350. Lowell Dittmer, Chinese Informal Politics, 34 CHINA J. 1, 5 (1995).
351. According to Dittmer, id. at 2, a faction is “a vertically organized patron-client network
linked by personal (face-to-face) ‘connections’ (guanxi).” He further offers an explanation for the
existence and prevalence of factionalism in the Chinese political system, particularly at the highest
level: “[a]t the highest level, because the task to be performed are relatively unstructured, the area
of discretion large, personal judgment crucial, the demand for quick decisions great, and secrecy
imperative, informal politics prevails.” Id. at 17.
352. Victor Shih, Wei Shan & Mingxing Liu, Gauging the Elite Political Equilibrium in the
CCP: A Quantitative Approach Using Biographical Data, 201 CHINA Q. 79 (2010).
353. Id. at 80.
354. According to the 2007 Party Congress Communiqué, “collective leadership” is “a system
with division of responsibilities among individual leaders in an effort to prevent arbitrary decision
making by a single top leader.” Cheng Li, The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A
Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China, 211 CHINA Q. 595, 608 (2012).
355. However, since he became the general secretary of the Party in 2012, Xi Jinping has
changed the political status quo to a certain extent with his bold anti-corruption campaign and his
aggressive consolidation of power. It remains to be seen whether the form of collective leadership
can be maintained in the future. For more detailed discussions on this issue, see CHENG LI, CHINESE
POLITICS IN THE XI JINPING ERA: REASSESSING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (2016), and SEBASTIAN
HEILMANN & MATTHIAS STEPAN, CHINA’S CORE EXECUTIVE: LEADERSHIP STYLES, STRUCTURES
AND PROCESSES UNDER XI JINPING (2016).
356. Joseph Fewsmith, The New Shape of Elite Politics, 45 CHINA J. 83, 89 (2001) (arguing
that factional politics is more important in the reform era than before because “[a]s revolutionary
legitimacy declines, as ideology loses its power to persuade, much less mobilize, and as Party
discipline declines, there appears to be a marked increase in the importance of personal power and
personal ties.”).
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Factional factors play an essential role in selecting and promoting
officials within the Chinese political system. Earlier studies, such as Li
and Zhou,357 showed that the likelihood of promotion of provincial
leaders was positively correlated with their economic performances
(measured by GDP growth); Shih, Adolph, and Liu challenge this
conclusion.358 They report that factional ties with various top leaders of
the party-state, rather than strong economic performance, boost the
officials’ chances of climbing higher in the Party’s upper echelons
through much of the reform period. Shih, Adolph, and Liu’s conclusion
is further supported by subsequent studies, such as Jia, Kudamatsu, and
Seim (2015);359 Opper, Nee and Brehm;360 and Francis, Trebbi and
Xiao.361
Factional politics not only determine the promotion chances of
Chinese officials but also influence the design and implementation of
economic policies,362 including financial policies. Shih argues that the
357. Hongbin Li & Li-An Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive
Role of Personnel Control in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743, 1744 (2005).
358. Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph & Mingxing Liu, Getting Ahead in the Communist Party:
Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
166, 167 (2012).
359. Ruixue Jia, Masayuki Kudamatsu & David Seim, Political Selection in China: The
Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance, 13 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 631, 633 (2015).
The conclusion can be said to support both Li & Zhou, supra note 357, and Shih et al., supra note
358, because the authors show that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese
political selection process. More specifically, “[w]eakly performing provincial leaders are unlikely
to be promoted irrespective of their connections, while connections increase the likelihood of
promotion for strongly performing provincial leaders.” Jia et al., supra note 359, at 633.
360. Sonja Opper, Victor Nee & Stefan Brehm, Homophily in the Career Mobility of China’s
Political Elite, 54 SOC. SCI. RES. 332, 343-52 (2015). They develop a homophilic index focusing
on joint provincial origin, joint school experience, and joint work experience between provincial
leaders and members of China’s supreme decision-making body, the Politbureau’s Standing
Committee, and empirically confirm a positive association between homophily and promotion
chances.
361. Patrick Francis, Francesco Trebbi & Kairong Xiao, Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory
and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22775, 2016). Similarly to Cheng Li, China’s Team of Rivals, 171 FOREIGN POL’Y 88-93
(2009) and Li, supra note 354, the authors identify two main factions inside the Party: tuanpai (a
faction of Communist Youth League of China (CYLC), an ancillary organization to the Party
responsible for the youth), which is led by the former President Hu Jintao, and Shanghai Gang, a
group of Party officials who are connected to the Shanghai municipal administration and close to
former President Jiang Zemin. They then report that, on average, tuanpai and Shanghai Gang
members exhibit promotion rates that are higher by ten percentage points relative to neutral
members.
362. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s
Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505, 507 (2006) (arguing, “faction leaders sought supremacy
within the Party by demonstrating the effectiveness of their chosen policies across the chessboard
of China’s territorial administration.”). We, therefore, can witness “the temporal pattern of reform,
which ebbed and flowed with shifts in the factional balance of power . . . .” Id. See also Wing-
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path of Chinese financial reform in the mid-1990s was shaped by a series
of short-term political calculations aimed at strengthening the power of
individual leaders,363 or more specifically, the former Premier Zhu Rongji
(and his faction).364 The core of Zhu’s reform strategy was to centralize
power in financial resource allocation. By consolidating financial power
at the central level (and depriving local officials of access to cheap credit
from banks), Zhu could use the distribution of financial resources as a
political bargaining chip at the Politburo level. With control over
financial resources, he could bargain either for political support in the
event of a setback or for the promotion of a close protégé,365 which would
increase his post-retirement influence. In addition, Zhu and his followers
had a strong disincentive to carry out fundamental financial reforms that
may have benefited China’s economy in the long-term but may have
potentially jeopardized short-term stability or prevented solutions to
more pressing issues: after all, his performance was evaluated by shortterm results.366 The real consequence of the so-called “financial reform”
in the Zhu era was actually a consolidation of financial power and a
covering up of the fundamental problems (such as the NPLs problem),
rather than conducting a market-oriented financial overhaul.
Thanks to the factional conflict, it became even more impracticable
to conduct serious financial reform in the Hu Wen era (2002-2012). As
Li has described, policy making and implementation became
Chung Ho, What Analyses of Factional Politics of China Might Miss When the Market Becomes a
Political Battlefield: The Telecommunication Sector as a Case in Point, 13 CHINA REV. 7, 85
(2013) (concluding that “particular reform policies, anti-corruption measures, and even corporate
decisions in specific markets are increasingly used as political weapons in high-level political
struggles.”).
363. Victor Shih, Dealing with Non-Performing Loans: Political Constraints and Financial
Policies in China, 180 CHINA Q. 922 (2004).
364. SHIH, supra note 348. Compared with Zhu’s faction (and factions with similar preference,
i.e., central control over policy tools, including financial resources), which Shih has defined as the
“technocratic faction” (they are mainly central bureaucrats who have ranks of vice minister or
above); there is another faction he termed the “generalist faction,” which consists of provincial
leaders who have the strongest control over the Party apparatus and prefer to decentralize financial
power so that their followers at local levels may access bank loans to boost local economic
development. See also Victor Shih, Factions Matter: Personal Networks and the Distribution of
Bank Loans in China, 13 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 3, 19 (2004); SHIH, supra note 348 (reporting that
factional ties have had a significant positive effect on the distribution of bank loans to provinces
during the reform era).
365. His disciples, such as Lou Jiwei and Guo Shuqing, still play important roles in China’s
economic decision-making. Lou was China’s Minister of Finance between 2013 and 2016 and is
now the Chairman of the National Council of Social Security Fund. Guo was the Governor of
Shandong Province between 2013 and 2017 and is now the Chairman of the CBRC. Guo is believed
to be a potential candidate for the position of Governor of the People´s Bank of China (PBOC).
366. Victor Shih, Partial Reform Equilibrium, Chinese Style: Political Incentives and Reform
Stagnation in Chinese Financial Policies, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 1238, 1246 (2007).
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considerably more difficult in the Hu-Wen era, particularly when there
was disagreement or controversy among factions. Scissors argues further
that since Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took power, market-oriented
liberalization had been “minor.”367 Therefore, the United States should
be wary of “fake Chinese economic reform.”368 As a matter of fact, Hu
and Wen’s administration record on reforming China’s economic and
financial system is so disappointing that some prominent Chinese public
intellectuals openly refer to the two five-year terms of the Hu–Wen
leadership as “the lost decade.”
Factional politics seems to have continued to dampen the outlook of
China’s financial liberalization in the Xi-Li era since 2012. It has been
argued that market-oriented reform has found new momentum after the
Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013.369 A recent
estimation of the reform performance of the new generation of leaders
concludes that “it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the reform
process overall has stumbled and is in serious trouble.”370 A plausible
explanation lies in the fact that there are two camps inside the decisionmaking circle, which disagree on certain fundamental economic issues
such as the priority of economic growth (speed vs. efficiency), the risk of

367. Derek Scissors, Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China, 88 FOREIGN
AFF. 24 (2009).
368. DEREK SCISSORS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE U.S. SHOULD BE WARY OF FAKE
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM (2013), https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-us-should-bewary-fake-chinese-economic-reform.
369. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (adopted by the Communist. Party of
China Cent. Comm., Nov. 12, 2013), http://english.court.gov.cn/2015-10/08/content_22130532.
htm. According to the decision reached by this conference, for the first time, market forces are
acknowledged to play a “decisive” role in resource allocation rather than the “basic” role admitted
by previous Party decisions. The to-do list laid out by the decision is extraordinarily ambitious,
comprising 60 articles and because each article contains several specific policy initiatives, over 300
different policy initiatives. Basically, every important economic issue is addressed by the decision,
including the liberalization of interest and exchange rates, the assignment of expenditure
responsibilities between the central and local governments, and the dividend policy of state-owned
enterprises.
370. Barry Naughton, Xi Jinping’s Economic Policy in the Run-up to the 19th Party Congress:
The Gift from Donald Trump, 52 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 3 (2017). More specifically, the
author argues that “the prospect of a large package of interrelated reforms achieving success
together has disappeared, and many complex multi-stage reforms are in limbo… A number of
individual reforms have been watered down… Most tellingly, financial reforms of the stock market
and capital account liberalization have been spectacular failures.” In another article, he states that
“Xi Jinping’s support for market-oriented economic reforms has been disappointing. Since the
Third Plenum of 2013, Xi has failed to give strong or consistent backing to any of the most
important market-oriented reforms.” Barry Naughton, The Regulatory Storm: A Surprising Turn in
Financial Policy, 53 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 9 (2017).

XU & FAURE (FINAL_FOR_JCI) (DO NOT DELETE)

76

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

10/28/2019 2:07 PM

[Vol. 42:1

accumulating debt, and the model of SOE reform.371 The conflict between
these two groups has become public after the publication of a May 9,
2016, People’s Daily article.372 The author of the People’s Daily article
is believed to be the right-hand man of President Xi. The article openly
criticizes Premier Li Keqiang’s policies,373 and this conflict is described
as “a severe policy split in the leadership between Xi Jinping, who favors
pressing forward with reform now, despite the sagging growth rate of
China’s economy, and Premier Li Keqiang, who is perceived to be
pressing for short-term stimulus measures to sustain higher growth rates
and postponing reform.”374 The aftermath of such factional conflict on
China’s financial landscape remains to be seen.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we explained the importance of regulation aimed at
financial repression by explaining what is sometimes referred to as the
“Chinese economic miracle.” We started by presenting the classic
economic view (mostly represented by McKinnon and Shaw) that a
repression of the financial sector would slow down economic growth.
The traditional remedy for financial repression, especially addressed at
developing countries, was, therefore, financial liberalization. However,
both theoretical and empirical literature indicated that financial
liberalization will only have beneficial effects on economic growth if it
is accompanied with an effective system of prudential regulation and
supervision.
Against this background, we examined the details of the regulation
of financial markets in China and found that there is (1) a large state
ownership in the banking sector; (2) a severe misallocation of credit,
disfavoring the private sector; and (3) strong interest rates controls,
leading to an artificially low cost of capital. These features of the financial
repression system in China were only reinforced with the stimulus
371. Barry Naughton, Supply-Side Structural Reform: Policy-makers Look For a Way Out, 49
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (2016) (“economic policy over the past year has been inconsistent,
ineffective, and on occasion entirely counterproductive,” and the reason is that there are “deep
divisions about the appropriate relationship between reform and growth or macroeconomic policy,
and uncertainty and confusion about the channels of policy-making and who is in charge of
economic policy on a day-to-day basis.”); See also Barry Naughton, Two Trains Running: SupplySide Reform, SOE Reform and the Authoritative Personage, 50 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1
(2016).
372. See Gong et al., supra note 257.
373. President Xi and Premier Li are believed to be affiliated with different factions.
374. Alice Miller, ‘Core’ Leaders, ‘Authoritative Persons’, and Reform Pushback, 50 CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 9 (2016).
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program of 2008, which aimed to boost China’s economic growth
through Local Government Financing Vehicles. We showed that there are
several important micro- and macro-economic effects of the financial
repression. Micro-economic effects are, inter alia, resources
misallocation and efficiency loss. At the macro-level, China’s growth
pattern has become more credit-driven, favoring state-owned enterprises
and based on investments rather than consumption. Such an investmentbased economic growth will potentially be unsustainable in the long run.
We argue that the system of financial repression is deeply rooted in
the party state’s essence. Given the importance of financial resources for
boosting growth, rewarding loyalty, buying stability, and maintaining the
Party’s rule, it is not surprising that the Party has never loosened its
control over the financial industry and may not loosen it in the future.
China’s financial repression is, therefore, not a result of market evolution
or regulatory design; rather, it is an intentional artifact used to maximize
the opportunities of survival of the Party (or certain factions or certain
leaders inside the Party). In Shih’s words, “the Chinese case reveals that
the process of reforms is necessarily a political one, not a simple policy
exercise by insulated, beneficent social planners.”375 It is therefore
impossible to understand the nature of China’s financial development
without understanding the intentions, capabilities, and constraints of the
Party. In Minxin Pei’s succinct words, “[i]t’s politics, stupid.”376

375. Shih, supra note 366, at 1239.
376. Minxin Pei, The root of China’s economic troubles? It’s politics, stupid, NIKKEI ASIA
REV. (Oct 1, 2015), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Minxin-Pei-The-root-of-China-s-economictroubles-It-s-politics-stupid.

